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Editors' Statement

The West's relatively straightforward military victory in Iraq is in danger of turning into a severe political and moral defeat. Today, a year after the hastily declared end of hostilities, the conduct of the war and the military actions of democratic states are being questioned to an even greater extent than was the case in the spring of 2003, when we saw evidence of this in the worldwide protests against the war coalition. The Bush administration, blinded by the hubris caused by unprecedented military superiority, had turned a deaf ear to all warnings about the unpredictable consequences of a war that constituted a breach of international law. Now there is chaos between the Tigris and the Euphrates.

The West and its supremacy have once again, in a terrible way, reinforced the feelings of resentment that are present in the Islamic world and, in so doing, have set in motion a worrying and mutually reinforcing dynamic of war, occupation, resistance, and retaliation. The whole region is now even less stable than it was before the Iraq war, and the precarious situation in Palestine contributes to this instability. Peace and democracy for the whole of the "Greater Middle East" – such declarations sound empty at present, and those partners in the Arab world who are prepared to cooperate feel they have been snubbed. Anyone who does not know how to create the conditions for peace should not wage war. Moreover, the breaches of the Geneva Conventions by US military personnel completely undermine the idea that the war was justified as an attempt to set democracy in motion by military means.

At the same time, the war and the occupation of Iraq have had negative effects on the entire system of international relations; the fundamental rules of this system and its achievements in terms of human rights are being devalued by strategies of violence and the deprivation of rights. The brutal methods employed by the occupying forces provoke, and are already bringing about, a terrible acceleration of the spiral of violence and a willingness in heads and hearts to resort to arms. The cases of torture that have now come to light, whoever may have given the orders, seem like a curse returning to haunt those who waged war in defiance of international law. When the arrogance of power threatens to discredit democracy itself, our most fundamental interests are affected.

Since the attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, it is no longer possible to pretend that Europe is not also a target of Islamist terrorism. The Bush administration's Iraq policy has not succeeded in depriving these terrorists of support; rather, they now feel confirmed in their belief that they must struggle against the West. The "war against terrorism" and against the "axis of evil" has not made the world safer. It is now a more dangerous place, and Iraq has become a base and breeding ground for transnational terrorism.

It is even clearer than it was a year ago that all the talk of threats serves to block perspectives more conducive to peace. Transnational terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the disintegration of statehood became objects of international security strategies

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because it was believed military action was the best way of meeting such threats. But these are only some of the threats confronting the world today. If effective peace strategies are to be developed, all the dangers that threaten people's lives and welfare must be considered: hunger and poverty, economic inequality and political injustice, economies of violence that make conflicts worse, epidemics, shortages of resources, and the numerous ecological dangers. The community of states will not be able to tackle these problems with the help of wars, armaments, or new security strategies. What is needed instead are joint efforts to bring about a more just world in which there are fewer tensions, the rejection of violence as a political method, and the implementation of long-term peace processes and strategies. This year's *Friedensgutachten* concentrates on these issues.

1. Europe's political will to peace

The experience of two world wars has discredited war as a way of pursuing politics in Europe. This, together with the external conflict in the shape of the East-West conflict and the nation-state's loss of power in the course of the globalization process, created favourable conditions for European unification. The goal was to use economic and political integration as a way of overcoming national enmities and rivalries and promoting economic development. European integration is rightly seen as a successful peace project. This success story has shaped European attitudes to the use of force.

Immediately before the Iraq war, the European states were torn between their rejection of a war of intervention and their traditional loyalty to the great power across the Atlantic. There were also differing assessments of the threat, which meant that the first signs of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) were less influential than national foreign policies. For the first time in its history, the Federal Republic of Germany joined France in opposing Washington. London, Rome, Madrid and others objected to this, and subordinated any misgivings they might have had about the breach of international law to the requirements of transatlantic solidarity.

European societies and public opinion, on the other hand, were to a large extent united in their criticism of the Washington neoconservatives' imperial demeanour and their strategy of preventive war and violent regime change. It remains to be seen whether the peace demonstrations of February 15, 2003 will, "when the history books are written, be seen as a sign of the birth of European public opinion", as Jürgen Habermas speculated. It was nevertheless clear that Europeans were opposed to the return of war as an everyday means of power politics.

Transatlantic relations are not obsolete

If forced to choose between closer and deeper cooperation with Brussels and the alternative of an alliance with Washington, many EU states – especially the new members – will prefer the latter option. This means that any attempt to form an alliance against the USA will split and not unite Europe. However, the reverse is also true: uncritical attempts to curry favour with Washington are not the best way to unite Europe on questions of foreign policy. There is no shortage of centres of conflict in the world where the USA, as the dominant power, will have to be involved in any future attempt to find a solution. We want to establish the promotion of peace as the criterion employed to measure international efforts to bring about order.

America and Europe are united by their shared social model. However, views differ on whether this constitutional model should be promoted exclusively on the basis of the example it provides, diplomatic activity, and economic incentives, or whether the shared canon of values can be spread around the globe by war and force of arms where necessary. The neoconservatives in Washington take the latter view, but most Europeans, and the traditions of American foreign policy as it has been conducted up until now, see things differently.

Given this situation, we consider it a fantasy to believe that an enlarged Europe could (or should) try to balance against the USA's hegemonic unilateralism. Precisely because the European Union will not develop into an aggressive, global military power, it must bring to bear its own specific capacities and strengths – and it must do this alongside, not in opposition to America. There are lessons to be learned on both sides of the Atlantic. The Americans are now realizing that military superiority cannot automatically be translated into the capacity to shape political outcomes. The Europeans are beginning to recognize that they have a global political responsibility, and that this also applies in relation to the consequences of American action.

EU enlargement: a historic milestone

On May 1, 2004 ten new member states joined the European Union. This event was celebrated in an appropriate manner. It was a milestone on the way to a Europe that has put its warlike past behind it. It is true that there proved to be limits to the peaceful transformation and integration process in the Balkans, but nationalist wars remained the exception this time. Rarely has such a difficult process of historical reordering been carried out so prudently and successfully.

The main tools that contributed to the EU's success here were its civil power strategy and soft power: diplomacy, economic incentives, the perspectives offered by association agreements and the prospect of accession, neighbourly cooperation, and arms control. The advancing juridification of international politics remains the dominant European conception of order. This means that at the interstate level too, equality before the

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law should take precedence over sheer power. This goal remains the correct one, even when the powerful are trampling international law underfoot. As a result, there is an even greater need for the European Union, as a major economic power, to exert its influence on the international order.

The limits of European peace policy

The EU, as a world trading power, cannot shirk its global responsibility and restrict its international policy to its immediate neighbourhood – even though this would suit many Europeans' tendency to wishful thinking. At the same time, however, it is not possible just to continue with the policy that has been successful up until now, namely cashing in the EU's attractiveness and exchanging it for the export of stability. The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, drawn up in 1999, explicitly held out the prospect of accession to all the Balkan states. In the case of Turkey, a member of NATO, the prospect of accession that has been on offer for decades has worked as an incentive for modernization and democratic reforms. Ankara is on the point of fulfilling the EU's conditions for the start of negotiations on accession. It looks as though the Turkish government under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is seeking to refute the widely held view that Islam as such is incompatible with democracy. This project should be supported by all possible means. Europe's attitude towards Turkey will also be one measure of the Europeans' contribution to the improvement of relations with the Muslim world, and so also to the reduction of international tension.

The enlargement of the EU has, at least in the old member states, mainly been driven forward by the political elites without broad participation on the part of the citizens. This has not made it any easier to allay fears of unknown social consequences; in addition, the fact that the Europeans will in future have to make a greater contribution to shaping the world, and will have to do this whether they want to or not, has done nothing to bring about the necessary change in their consciousness. In particular, they will have more to do with their new next-door neighbours, for whom there seems to be no realistic prospect of accession. The EU will have to find other ways of promoting reform, democratization, and willingness to cooperate in its relations with Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, as well as in its dealings with the states bordering on the Mediterranean and in the Middle East. New concepts of association, neighbourhood, and partnership will be required, and the EU will be able to use the experience acquired in the CSCE/OSCE and Barcelona processes.

However, the enlarged European Union will have to deal with the consequences of the old members' failure to reform the institutions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) before enlargement. As a result, the EU will in future not find it any easier to reach agreement on a joint policy. In the 25-member EU, the respective influences of history, geography, and tangible interests mean that foreign and security policy inclinations will diverge. For Spain, Morocco and even Latin America

are closer to home than Poland and the Baltic, while Germany has borders with some of the new members and must concern itself with cooperation with Russia. It will be more difficult than it has been in the past to bring these centrifugal forces together in order to reach political agreement and to make them capable of acting. In comparative terms, this will cause fewer problems in the sphere of common external economic policy, but diverging interests and conflicts of interest become more noticeable to the extent that the narrow security policy core of foreign policy is affected. This need not be seen purely as a disadvantage, since these centrifugal forces counteract efforts to turn the EU into a military power.

Security strategy: an area left deliberately vague

The EU has, with the first adoption in December 2003 of a security concept (the Solana paper) and the formulations on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) contained in the draft EU constitution, moved onto the controversial territory of formation of a strategy for foreign and security policy. Unfortunately, too many compromises had to be made in the course of the attempt to position the EU alongside the USA as a strategic global actor and at the same time to overcome national parish pump politics by drawing up a joint EU policy. The result is a threat analysis which stresses terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, disintegrating states, and crime, and so is too narrow to do justice to the complex challenges posed by globalization and to the diverse threats to security that are described, for example, in the United Nations' *Millennium Report*. The EU defines security in a narrow military sense as a precondition of development, and pays too little attention to the other way of looking at the issue, which treats social, economic, and legal aspects of development as the point of departure for security. In addition, the logic of this analysis blurs the clear dividing line between civil and military instruments in crisis prevention. There is a *de facto* prioritization of military resources and capacities. The reader searches in vain for a clear statement to the effect that military interventions should only be the *ultima ratio*. We are equally unhappy about the deliberately vague talk of "early, rapid and when necessary robust intervention". When is such intervention necessary, and what democratic constraints are placed on it?

The *Bundeswehr* is setting its sights wrongly

Germany security policy is also providing convincing evidence of the gulf between strategic reason and military ambition. On the one hand, Germany decisively rejected the Iraq adventure of the alliance's dominant power; on the other hand, the country's defence policy guidelines are being zealously adapted to meet the alliance's conceptual specifications. The Defence Ministry's structural and equipment planning is designed to provide for armed forces that can wage war anywhere in the world. This not only goes beyond the mission laid down for the *Bundeswehr* in the

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country's constitution, it also bears no relation to any analysis of requirements that is convincing in terms of security policy.

Despite this, the everyday life of the *Bundeswehr* has for some time been shaped by a process of restructuring designed to turn it into an intervention army. What the armed forces rehearse in manoeuvres is not the defence of their own territory but the capture of enemy territory. The *Bundeswehr* is spending millions on adapting the Eurofighter, which was originally developed as an interceptor, so that it can also operate as a bomber. It is insisting on keeping the controversial Kyritzer Heide training area, which is the only one in Germany suitable for the simulation of offensive operations using air-to-ground missiles. Internally, it is implementing a new model, the idea of the "army in action" ("*Armee im Einsatz*"). There is a danger that the civilian traditions which have served to distinguish the *Bundeswehr* in substantial ways from its predecessors will fall by the wayside. The Inspector of the Army, General Hans-Otto Budde, is already demanding that the idea of the "citizen in uniform" should be replaced by that of the "ancient warrior" ("*archaischer Kämpfer*"). These tendencies, which go directly against the mission of the *Bundeswehr* as laid down in the constitution, are alarming. Instead of going further down this road, the German side should try harder to influence the reform of the EU's armed contingents in such a way that a mobile and rapidly deployable peacekeeping force, which could be called upon by the UN General Secretary, is set up.

Disarmament - for others only?

The draft constitution of the European Union is also characterized by a disturbing prioritization of military options, for example in way the text explicitly provides for a Defence Agency. It is quite inappropriate for such an institution, which is supposed to harmonize the interests of European weapons laboratories and producers, to be mentioned in a constitution. This can be contrasted with the omission of the idea of an "Office for civil crisis prevention and conflict management", which was demanded by many nongovernmental organizations and by peace researchers. This outcome says a good deal about the strength of societal forces and their lobbying activities.

Even more alarming, and against the background of the experience of the CSCE quite incomprehensible, is the fact that international disarmament is not among the goals of security policy that make up the EU's strategic catalogue. It is true that the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction is on the EU's agenda, and that the Union says it intends to intensify its efforts to bring about disarmament on the part of others. However, EU states' own weapons are not affected by this. Our view is that in spite of the USA's policy of blocking moves in this area, new initiatives to bring about multilateral arms control are both possible and urgently needed, for example in the framework of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. The EU states continue to be among those who spend too

much rather than too little on arms. Annual expenditure on weapons procurement in the defence budgets of the EU member states amounts to approximately 20 billion euros. These procurements are only to a limited extent the outcome of mutually agreed planning, and it is still the case that different states develop and produce versions of the same modern weapons systems and other equipment. Almost all EU countries have their own army, navy, and air force, and there have been no moves towards any division of labour that could use public funds more efficiently. The USA accounts for just over 40 per cent of all world military expenditure, and the EU states for a further 25 per cent. All other countries of the world together account for the remaining 35 per cent. In view of this concentration of expenditure in a few western countries, the EU should be arguing in the UN for a reversal of the trend towards rising military expenditure, so that funds can be made available for crisis prevention measures oriented towards the long term and for measures to be taken in the aftermath of conflicts. The code of conduct for the export of armaments from EU member states should be made legally binding and enforced.

Civil CFSP before ESDP

By proceeding along the path it has now chosen and prioritizing security, defence, and armaments policy, the European Union is moving further and further away from the civil power model. Our advice to those responsible for this area of policy is that they should stop getting themselves tangled up in the jungle of ESDP-related details of industrial competition and individual national interests, and pay more attention to the further development of CFSP and the requirements of development policy. EU foreign policy should concentrate on its strengths: economic integration, diplomacy, civil crisis prevention, and conflict management. The conceptual and material resources available should be reorganized in order to improve the EU's capacity to contribute, within a framework of multilaterally agreed action, to the reduction of structural and current causes of crises and violence. After the Iraq experience, it is more important than ever that the way this is done should be in accordance with the norms of international law.

2. Peace requires law and international cooperation

Legal certainty is a basic precondition of peaceful coexistence. If it is absent, individuals, groups and states resort in an arbitrary way to self-defence and arbitrary law. This inevitably leads to a spiral of mutual retaliation. Such escalations are in turn a central cause of the disintegration of state structures (failing states). Similar kinds of behaviour can also be seen increasingly in international relations, for example in the almost automatic sequence of Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli military strikes that fail to distinguish between suspected terrorists and accidental

victims. Attempts were made to justify the filmed beheading of an American as a response to the torture of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers, and there were attempts to justify the massive American bombardment of Falluja as a response to the public mutilation of corpses.

The experts all agree that international law was seriously flouted in the Iraq war, but its validity was not fundamentally damaged. The USA and UK have themselves tried to portray the war as a measure taken *in conformity* with international law. The worldwide criticism of their actions demonstrates that no new customary law is coming into being. Shock at the consequences of the war is widespread even among the populations of states that were part of the war coalition, and signs of this can be seen in the actions of their governments. This situation must be seen as an opportunity to restore the authority of the UN system. Complaints about the inability of the UN Security Council to act decisively are well-founded, but we should not forget the causes of this weakness. These causes are to be found in the behaviour of the states and to a considerable extent of the permanent members of the Security Council, who are unwilling to recognize that this body has a responsibility to take action in the sphere of peace policy.

We therefore welcome the initiative launched by the Council of Europe on April 28, 2004. The goal of this initiative is to bring about a situation in which the Security Council is more representative of all members of the UN. The Security Council's ability to act would be strengthened by a change to the right of veto, whereby no single permanent member would be able to exercise a veto; in future, only two members voting together could do this. In addition, the right of veto would be restricted to breaches of world peace and international security.

Human rights between universalism and particularism

In accordance with a western conception of the individual, the idea of codified human rights gives the individual priority over the community. For other cultures, particularly Asian ones, the community comes before the individual. Islam, too, places the *umma* above the individual. However, even critics of the idea of universally valid human rights do not wish to question these rights in general; they merely wish to propose modifications. One possible way of taking cultural differences into account is to treat subjective experiences of injustice as the point of departure, and on this basis to specify indispensable rights to the protection of the person. For example: women from all cultures denounce as injustice infringements of their right to self-determination. The mistreatment and torture of prisoners are seen as examples of injustice by all legal traditions regardless of their cultural specificity, and genocide and mass expulsions are decisively rejected everywhere.

It is evident that there exists an unquestioned and non-negotiable core category of human rights which includes the sphere of international humanitarian law. Where there are divergent interpretations, the first pri-

ority must be a procedure that is secure and just. The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) takes this insight into account. It must be possible to bring those accused of war crimes before this tribunal, wherever the crimes may have been committed and whoever is accused of them. States that do not want to accept this procedure endanger international legal certainty and so place peace at risk. Especially after what has happened in Iraq, the USA must be pressured to abandon its rejection of the ICC. In addition, the members of the UN Security Council should refuse to give in to the USA's wish that American citizens should be granted immunity from international criminal proceedings.

A credible strategy for combating terrorism must, through its actions and its choice of methods, make clear what it is defending. If it disregards human rights, international law, and basic humanitarian values, it is not only the success of the strategy that will be placed in question. States which act in this way also damage the order that needs to be protected and disqualify themselves as members of the international community of law. Abandoning established fundamental freedoms and rights is not the way to improve security.

International cooperation rather than alliance-building

Europe should recognize that it has a vital interest in preventing the international order from relapsing into power politics and alliance-building. One aspect of this is that Russia and China should be integrated as closely as possible into the cooperative institutions of the international order. This has nothing to do with power-balancing or with an "axis" directed against the USA, but is a matter of strengthening multilateral institutionalism – which is part of EU policy.

Russia, in spite of its economic and political weaknesses, remains the second most powerful nuclear state, and so is extremely important for Europe's security. Although there is a dark side to the country's rather authoritarian version of democracy, Moscow's foreign and security policy under Vladimir Putin has not taken any unexpected turns. On March 29, 2004, seven states – Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia – joined NATO. With the exception of Slovenia, all of these countries belonged to the socialist camp and the Warsaw Pact up until 1990-91. Russia is now remarkably relaxed about the shifts in power relations associated with the liquidation of the heritage of Soviet rule, and is also very concerned that its relations with the states of the CIS should be based upon cooperative stability. The West Europeans would therefore be well advised to keep their relations with Russia on an even keel, without abrupt shifts of policy such as can be seen at the moment in the policy of the US administration (primarily for reasons that have to do with the presidential election campaign). The EU should further intensify its cooperation with Russia and in this way support the continuation of economic transformation and democratization.

This includes insisting that human rights must be respected, in Chechnya and elsewhere.

China considers the strengthening of relations with the EU to be an important part of its foreign policy, and documented this for the first time in October 2003 with the publication of an official *EU Policy Paper*. In this document, relations between China and Europe are described as free from conflicts or threats from either side. The goal of Chinese policy is said to be the systematic consolidation of cooperation in all fields of policy, though fundamental Chinese positions – for instance on Taiwan and Tibet – should not be on the table. The document expressly calls on the EU to lift the embargo on arms sales imposed after the suppression of the protest movement in 1989. There is some support for such a move in the EU, especially in France and Germany. The USA, however, is firmly opposed to any relaxation. The EU postponed a final decision before the elections in Taiwan, and the issue is to be discussed again at the EU-China summit in December 2004. Our view is that the most recent Chinese EU initiative should be welcomed, since it (among other things) makes it possible to extend the dialogue on the rule of law and human rights, and because it could in general terms make the EU more of a focus of attention in Chinese foreign and security policy. Europe should take advantage of this opportunity and also bring China into a dialogue on security; however, the export of arms should be no part of this dialogue. Such a dialogue should not avoid awkward questions, and should be a forum in which human rights, the Taiwan question, and the territorial conflict in the South China Sea can be addressed.

3. The Greater Middle East? Peace strategies as attempts to square the circle

There are a number of indications that the broad Middle East region will in the next decade become a more central part of efforts to bring about international peace and order. After the manifest failure of its domino theory, according to which the Iraq war was supposed to mark the beginning of a rapid wave of democratization in the neighbouring states, Washington has developed a *Greater Middle East Initiative*. The fundamental defect of this plan is that it was announced unilaterally, without any dialogue with those affected and without being agreed with the USA's allies. Despite this, there is a clear need for an overarching political concept in a strategically important region full of historical, ethnic, religious, and social fault-lines.

Any regional peace strategy with the goals of cooperation on CSCE and OSCE lines in the field of arms control policy and of societal modernization and democratization would be worthy of support. The Europeans should attempt, more energetically than they have done up until now, to strengthen forces sympathetic to reform and to encourage existing regimes to undertake reforms by offering dialogue, incentives, and

conditional assistance. However, any such efforts will be in vain as long as it proves impossible to defuse regional conflicts, the most important of which is the one between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The EU's credibility in the region also depends on whether it succeeds in making it clear to the USA, the key power, that it has its own position on this question.

The chaotic situation in Iraq

The actions of the United States and its coalition in conducting their campaign against Iraq and putting in place an obviously unprepared occupation regime were an arbitrary act, and one that involved an overestimation of American capabilities. The war removed Saddam Hussein's regime from power, but after a year of occupation the situation is disastrous. Iraq is neither democratic nor free, and it is certainly not secure. For many Iraqis, the hope they felt as a result of the overthrow of the tyrant by foreign troops has now been replaced by growing desperation, a day-to-day struggle to exist, daily danger to life and limb, and humiliation that has been either experienced directly or witnessed via the media.

Iraq is carrying a burden placed on it by decades of dictatorship, three wars within one generation, and twelve years of being drained economically by a merciless sanctions regime. After a year of occupation, bombings and armed attacks are everyday occurrences, as are clashes between the occupying forces and a range of rebel militias. It is difficult to distinguish between the different forms of violence, and they cannot be dismissed as the usual confusion that follows in the wake of war. Where does armed resistance against the foreign occupiers and their domestic collaborators end, and imported terrorism begin? Are we seeing attempts to radicalize groups via the violence of their own militias, or is the country already in a state of civil war? The balance of forces between secularist forces, moderate Islam, and Islamist extremists is unclear. One can no longer even rule out the possibility that Iraq could disintegrate into its ethnic and confessional component parts.

Military superiority and the capacity to shape political outcomes are two different things. Anyone who warned against the war might find it difficult not to say maliciously that it is up to the USA to sort out the mess it has created by starting the war in the first place. We consider this attitude to be unpolitical and irresponsible. However, we do not have any ready-formulated and convincing peace strategy that would offer a way out of the present chaotic situation. There is no course of action that does not involve enormous risks. All that can be said with any certainty is that those states which rejected the war will also have to participate in providing assistance to Iraq as soon as the country is no longer occupied and a sovereign government in Baghdad asks for help.

Every possible course of action involves risks

What is to be done? A strengthened military presence will not be enough to guarantee the order and security required for the construction of a democratic polity. If anything, such a step would be likely to radicalize the existing conflicts still further. We suspect that there is only likely to be a prospect of a genuine improvement in the situation in Iraq when the armed forces of the war coalition are no longer responsible for guaranteeing security. One can assume that a sufficiently representative and legitimate government in the country itself would be more acceptable than foreign troops. In this respect, an early US withdrawal could serve as a deescalatory signal.

However, Iraq is an extremely fragile political unit. The country has no long tradition of uncontested independent statehood, and has been shaped by religious and historical differences and conflicts between Shia and Sunni Muslims and between Arabs and Kurds. Saddam Hussein's dictatorship kept these centrifugal political forces under control by means of a totalitarian party and his omnipresent security apparatus. In addition, Iraq is entangled with six troubled and in part similarly fragile neighbouring states: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. Iraq's borders with these neighbours are precarious, and the neighbouring states have an effect on what happens in Iraq. If the country were to be left to its own devices as the result of a sudden withdrawal, this explosive mixture could mean abandoning it to chaos, together with the entire region.

The only way in which measures designed to bring about deescalation, and the security guarantees that will be necessary in Iraq for the foreseeable future, can be credibly legitimized and organized is if this is done under the auspices of the UN. This observation remains valid despite the fact that the UN's reputation in Iraq was severely damaged by years of sanctions and the war. Lakhdar Brahimi, the experienced UN Special Envoy to Iraq, deserves the fullest support for his work as a mediator. This mediation might be able to find a way in which, after a substantial transfer of sovereignty on June 30 to a Provisional Government which enjoys sufficient support from all relevant groups, general elections can be held by January 2005. In order to give the Iraqis a more central, democratic role in this process an Iraqi national conference should be convened, and an advisory assembly which can also be involved in the drawing up of a constitution should be elected from among the members of this body.

There are good arguments for a broad international engagement, including countries that are not burdened by having been involved in the war. As was done in the case of the Afghanistan Conference, the Quartet that is already engaged in attempts to solve the Middle East conflict (USA, EU, Russia, the UN) could become involved and could bring Iraq's six neighbours into a joint attempt to find a way forward. This 4+6+1 formula could take as its starting-point the shared interest of the

otherwise competing neighbouring states, in order to prevent any further destabilization or even the breakup of the Iraqi state. Admittedly, this presupposes a preparedness on Washington's part to cooperate with Iran and Syria. An international conference organized on these lines could attempt to give international support to a provisional Iraqi government that included the different forces in Iraqi society.

The withdrawal from Gaza should be treated as an opportunity

Even though the intention of the Israeli side to withdraw from the Gaza strip and to dismantle some settlements on the West Bank is avowedly not envisaged as something that will lead to a negotiated peace acceptable to both sides, one cannot exclude the possibility that the plan might have some positive consequences for the Middle East, where it is hard to see any way forward. However, the withdrawal will only be a step towards a workable solution to the conflict if actors capable of carrying their plans through ensure that it does in fact lead in this direction, and as long as the settlement and overdevelopment of the West Bank does not continue at the same time. What is needed here is more vigorous involvement on the part of the European Union, as one of the partners in the Middle East Quartet. The unilateral withdrawal must take place as an agreed, binding, and orderly handing over of security competences and of the infrastructure of the settlements to the Palestinian Authority. If Israel insists on leaving Gaza as a victor, there is a danger that the society left behind will descend into violence and chaos, and this will be used as an argument against any further Israeli withdrawal from the occupied West Bank. If, on the other hand, a polity comes into being in Gaza which is itself capable of providing law and order and of preventing attacks on Israel, there will be a prospect of breaking the cycle of terror and counter-terror and placing the two-state solution envisaged by the Road Map back on the agenda.

The EU can help this process by assisting the Palestinian Authority to establish itself in the Gaza strip as a legitimate leadership which enjoys broad support among the population. Areas where assistance is particularly needed are reconstruction and economic recovery, the holding of overdue elections, and keeping unauthorized militant groups under control. An international presence, the mandate, leadership, and logistics of which would have to be agreed upon within the Quartet and by the Quartet in consultation with the conflict parties, would indicate that the Quartet is prepared to go beyond its role as an observer and take responsibility for essential elements of a peace process.

The measures to be taken must include structures on the ground that are prepared to cooperate and able to function. If militant Islamist forces which are popular because of the social services they provide as well as because of their commitment to armed struggle are excluded in advance, help from outside is unlikely to succeed in stabilizing the political system. The EU has followed the US example in the struggle against terror-

ism, and has placed on its list of terrorist groups the whole of Hamas, not just its armed wing; this makes it more difficult to bring the organization into legitimate, transparent, and responsible political structures.

The Geneva Initiative is one way forward

While supporting the Israeli withdrawal plan, the EU must be extremely careful not to become the accomplice of a project that might have been thought up as a way of finally burying the two-state solution. "Gaza plus" must be used as a first step, a way of reawakening in both societies the hope that a just peace is still possible. A clear outline of a solution to the conflict has taken shape in the Geneva accord. This initiative is therefore different from earlier proposals, which were treated as part of a "peace process" but did not have any consequences because no clear goals were specified, and also because those who put them forward did not have sufficient courage to reach compromises and to push them through in the face of opposition from those who were only prepared to accept all or nothing.

The Geneva Initiative is, for the time being, the last attempt to find a solution committed to the ideal of political reason. However, in the region itself, which is in danger of sinking into violence and resignation, it is widely considered to be wishful thinking. This makes it an even more urgent task to demonstrate to those directly affected that it is worth giving the plan a chance. How, if not by means of a declared readiness to take an active part in the search for a solution and by becoming involved on the ground, can the community of states convince the doubters among the population that it is possible to turn the vision into reality? This will involve monitoring activities, including monitoring of Israeli military withdrawal, mediation when disputes arise, the settlement and compensation of refugees, the provision of military protection for the Palestinian state, and other contributions. Any party which supports an initiative launched by civil society, in an effort to set in motion from below a change of perspective that offers a prospect of peace, is signaling a readiness to do whatever is necessary if and when a treaty is drawn up.

Unfortunately, there does not seem to be sufficient appreciation of this in Berlin. On February 13, 2004 the *Bundestag* passed a resolution supported by all parties and entitled "Revive the Road Map, Support the Geneva Initiative"; regrettably, the contents of the resolution do not live up to its imposing title. The German parliament's resolution is a lukewarm declaration of sympathy which followed the foreign minister's assessment that excessively concrete support was inadvisable because it could give rise to "a great need for interpretation" in Israel. Nowhere does the resolution call upon the German government to take action in the spirit of the Geneva Initiative. One can only hope that the government will do this anyway by trying to persuade its partners that they should breathe new life into the Road Map with the help of the initiative.

4. Peace requires crisis prevention

The fact that more attention is now being paid to long-term peace strategies reflects the experience of the last decade, during which many efforts in the areas of crisis prevention and peace consolidation proved unsuccessful. On the basis of UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, which was published in 1992, concepts of "preventive diplomacy" and of "peacemaking, securing peace, and peace consolidation" were developed, especially for application to interventions by external actors. The United Nations wanted the community of states to take more responsibility for preventing wars and for bringing about and maintaining lasting peace after violent conflicts in and between states and their societies. However, the effects in the sense of the successful prevention of violence have fallen well short of expectations.

One of the reasons for this is inadequate coordination. Because interests and strategies differ it is difficult to get the states involved to agree on a joint course of action, and measures taken by states are coordinated poorly or not at all with the activities of nongovernmental organizations. There can even be problems of coordination between the ministries of a single state. We therefore welcome the step taken by the German government in May 2004 in adopting a plan of action entitled *Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Solving, and Peace Consolidation*. This plan is designed to lend more coherence to crisis prevention policy, especially in the coordination of foreign, security, and development policy.

Early warning and the prevention of violence

Most conflict escalations can be spotted at an early stage. There are almost always clear signs of the stages that precede violence: a heightening of tension in society, a lowering of the threshold of violence, or increasing militarization. Even so, these indications that there is a danger of escalation and our knowledge about the causes of conflict are not, on their own, enough to ensure that preventive measures will be agreed upon.

The coordination that is necessary for this to happen can break down, even at the national level. In Germany, the Foreign Office has a Crisis Reaction Centre, the *Bundeswehr's* Centre for Communications monitors the situation in crisis regions on an ongoing basis, and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development puts together crisis indicators for its partner countries every year. It is almost inexcusable that these sources of information are not brought together so that a joint assessment can be made and crisis prevention measures initiated when necessary.

Every crisis which escalates into a violent conflict reminds us that if efforts were made earlier to address the causes of conflict and to influence the actors, it would be possible to prevent much human suffering, reduce the number of victims, and save the international community of states a good deal of money. Ten years ago, nothing was done to prevent

the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda, even though there were unmistakable indications of what was going to happen. It is to be feared that similar early warning signals could still be ignored today, because it is often impossible to interest the world community in dangers looming on the horizon or to persuade the most important national and international political actors that they should set in motion the necessary processes of consultation and voting. As a rule, it is not insufficient knowledge of what is going on but rather the failings of political decision-making which make it impossible to take appropriate measures to bring about deescalation at a time when they could make a difference.

In the case of Sudan, human rights and relief organizations, along with bodies responsible for early warning, have been calling on the international community for more than a year to take concerted preventive action, especially by putting pressure on the Sudanese government. This conflict involves the government in Khartoum, militias loyal to the government, and rebels, and it has now caused thousands of deaths. Over a million people have been driven from their homes, while hundreds of thousands have fled across the border into Chad, where they live in temporary camps and are threatened by disease and hunger. The UN envoy in Sudan, Mukash Kapila, and Human Rights Watch consider that "ethnic cleansing" has also taken place in Darfur. The community of states has so far done no more than issue appeals for a ceasefire. We support the demands of humanitarian organizations for measures that could force the Sudanese government to cease military operations in the region: for example, freezing Sudanese bank accounts abroad, placing limits on trade in Sudanese oil, and imposing conditions on financial assistance and development programmes.

Kofi Annan and some German politicians have now called for a UN-mandated military intervention as a way of ensuring that the population of Darfur is simply able to survive. This could perhaps stop things getting worse in the short term, and make it possible for relief organizations to alleviate the suffering of those who have been expelled. However, it would have been better to prevent the escalation when the first signs of it became visible, by exerting massive pressure on the Sudanese government.

There is, however, a serious problem associated with this kind of timely crisis prevention: it is almost impossible to draw attention to the success of such measures. We live in a media democracy, and the prevention of a conflict escalation, of an outbreak of violence, or of the disintegration of a state are not considered to be events deserving of headlines in the world press.

The German government's *Action Plan for Civil Crisis Prevention*

We consider the German government's recently adopted *Action Plan for Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Solving and Peace Consolidation* to be a step in the right direction; it has the potential to strengthen German for-

eign, security, and defence policy's commitment to the goal of crisis prevention. However, in order to give this commitment the greater weight it deserves, it would have been a good idea to create the post of a government coordinator with responsibility for civil crisis prevention. Without such a figure, other ways must be found of establishing coordinating bodies and staffs responsible for advice and action; these bodies should not just exchange views, but must also, on the basis of all available information, assess crises in a systematic way and determine when action needs to be taken.

In order to identify starting points and levels of action for prevention in the crisis countries under observation, the nongovernmental bodies involved in development cooperation in these countries should also be consulted so that their assessments of the situation can be taken into account. These bodies have contacts with groups and actors in civil society, and so are often in a position to contribute further information and at the same time to suggest additional levels at which concrete preventive measures can be taken.

In order to strengthen civil crisis prevention in a fundamental way, however, the first thing that needs to be done is for the *Bundestag* to make additional budgetary funds available. This a major weakness of the *Action Plan*. The main criterion used to select the 161 actions it proposes seems to have been the fact that they will not cost anything. Anyone who wants to pursue crisis prevention seriously must also show that they value this form of peace policy when it comes to drawing up the budget.

Peace consolidation

We now know a good deal about the complexities of peace processes. We have a clearer idea of the ways in which international, state, and nongovernmental actors can exert an influence from outside, but we also have a better idea of the limitations of such influence. We know, for example, that it is possible to provide support from outside for the reform of the security sector, which frequently disintegrates during conflicts. Foreign experts can make a valuable contribution to establishing and strengthening the norms and institutions needed to guarantee the rule of law, or in setting up new police forces. The international community can also help to establish channels of communication between the parties and, as a third party, to get a dialogue between them going or to keep it going. However, the setting up of democratic structures is something that can only to a limited extent be influenced from the outside, and the internal actors themselves must bear the main burden of responsibility for the work of societal reconciliation.

In long drawn-out crisis situations such as those in Afghanistan or Kosovo, lasting security can only come about as a result of societal and economic development. On the other hand, reconstruction work and other measures needed in the aftermath of conflicts can sometimes only be carried out under the protection of an international force. Although the

individual cases differ, we have seen evidence of this from Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR), Kosovo (KFOR), and Afghanistan (ISAF). Nevertheless, what frequently happens is that measures related to peace and development policy become subordinated in practice to military action, and this often has negative consequences for the deescalation and transformation of the conflict. Civil tasks carried out by the military should not serve exclusively to legitimize the presence of armed forces; rather, they must be part of a development concept designed to facilitate the reconstruction of state, economic, and social structures.

This leads us to demand that crisis prevention and peace consolidation should become established components of all external relations, whether this be in the fields of international economic policy, agricultural policy, environmental policy, foreign policy, security policy, or development policy. If this course of action is followed, it will gradually become possible to improve both the situation of those living in countries where there is a danger of violent conflict and the global threat situation. Each disintegrating state is characterized by its own social-political dynamics, but they are all the result of failures or unsuitable forms of international crisis prevention. We were made painfully aware of this by events in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s, and more recently in Afghanistan.

The most effective long-term contribution that can be made to the improvement of global security is the gradual elimination of the structural causes of conflict. This does not mean that military action will never be needed as *ultima ratio* in extreme emergencies, nor does it mean that we no longer need to take the necessary precautions to repel terrorist threats and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, a comprehensive peace strategy is orientated towards the security and welfare of *all*, and teaches us to act before orders fall apart, before the law of the jungle, arbitrary law, and retaliation get the upper hand, and before people are robbed of the fundamentals of their existence. Today, more than ever, we need to press ahead with an international peace policy reoriented in this way.

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