

## Friedensgutachten 2005

### Editors' Statement

*I am indeed a pacifist, but not a pacifist at any price. My views are virtually identical with those of Gandhi. But I would, individually and collectively resist violently any attempt to kill me or to take away from me, or my people, the basic means of subsistence. I was, therefore, of the conviction that it was justified and necessary to fight Hitler. For his was such an extreme attempt to destroy people. Furthermore, I am of the conviction that realisation of the goal of pacifism is possible only through supranational organisation. To stand unconditionally for this cause is, in my opinion, the criterion of true pacifism.*

*(Albert Einstein 1952)*

Einstein's "true pacifism" is not obsolete even sixty years after World War II. So far, we have been spared his worst fear of a nuclear arms race resulting in a global war of destruction. But hopes at the end of the Cold War that we would be entering a world without war were illusory. September 11, 2001 destroyed the cosy image which had divided the world into a democratic-liberal "zone of peace" and a "zone of war". The world is less clear-cut. The many varied causes of current wars and violent situations cannot be tackled using one and the same strategy.

In accord with Einstein's conditional pacifism, one must support the primacy of using peaceful means to tackle crises. In principle, all the UN Member States have agreed to this by acknowledging the UN Charter. Nonetheless, violations of the ban on violence are only all too frequent. The UN is still not equipped with the means for effectively dealing with outbreaks of violence. It lacks the necessary material powers to impose sanctions and, more importantly still, it lacks the willingness of the mightiest states to allow it the leading role to which it is entitled under the Charter. The UN Secretary-General has put forward far-reaching proposals for a reform of the UN with specific reference to the failure of the community of states to take action to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. These will be discussed by the General Assembly in September. Whereas the German Government is focusing its attention on the restructuring of the Security Council, we consider the proposals for a UN Commission and an office to co-ordinate peace consolidation as well as for a new Human Rights Council to be more important.

**Relevance of  
the UN and  
its reform**

**Peace players: mixed forms of co-operation**

But the UN alone can only achieve very little. Individual states, regional organisations and civil-society actors can, and must, accept responsibility for peace. In the course of the last few years, new, mixed structures have emerged which call into question the fundamental difference between traditional power politics and collective security. Take for example the so-called Quartet in the Middle East, in which such disparate soloists as the United States, Russia, the EU and the UN are playing together. Providing that they play in harmony, the three powers possess the material means to exert the necessary influence and pressure on the opposing sides in the Palestinian conflict. The part played by the UN's monopoly of legitimation, in the meantime, is to prevent international policy from reverting to separate, rival concerts by the great powers. There are indications that such mixed forms of co-operation will increase, one example being the Iraq Conference, which is to be held by the EU and the United States in Brussels on 23 June. These types of co-operation involve contradictions and remain a political balancing act as long as states hold the monopoly of material power. The aim of international policy must remain absolutely clear: to substitute power with the power of justice.

## **1. Containing acute violence**

**We should not close our eyes to violence**

The community of states should not simply sit back and watch genocide, serious violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing or continued warring conflicts. A change of consciousness can be observed in this respect, which is manifesting itself in the growing number of humanitarian interventions. But new questions and paradoxes arise when state sovereignty ceases to be more important than the protection of universal human rights: Who is entitled to intervene, and with what legitimation? Who is in a position to intervene, and by what means? And where is the dividing line between violations of law which can be terminated under national responsibility and the need for international intervention?

In practice, these questions are answered either by action or inaction - and unfortunately the answer is often wrong. All too often blatant injustices are passed over in diplomatic silence. The economic and domestic interests of mighty states and concern for fragile international relations lead to excessive reticence in tackling governments which violate hu-

man rights on a massive scale and thus endanger peace. Tibet, Chechnya and Darfur are examples.

### **Conflicting effects of the “war against terror”**

The tyranny of the Taliban and the murderous regime of Saddam Hussein were eliminated in the name of the “war against terror”, but this has not brought peace to either Afghanistan or Iraq. The massacres in Uzbekistan demonstrated one of the negative effects of the “war against terror”. For a long time, the Uzbek government succeeded in declaring its suppression of any kind of opposition as the fight against Islamist terrorists, and gained the sympathy of western states for its actions. Overfly rights and military bases close to the Afghan border were reason enough not only to grant Uzbekistan financial support but also to approve a repressive autocracy, which the demonstrators in Andijan finally rose up against. The regime purports to be a stronghold against Islam and the collapse of the state. This kind of “legitimacy of blackmail” can no longer be accepted - it leads into the same trap as Russia’s Chechnya policy.

### **Own dynamics of violence: Iraq is hanging in the balance**

The war against Iraq, which was illegal under international law, has not spread throughout the region like wildfire as many critics had forecast. Nevertheless, the occupation has produced a disturbing own dynamism of war, occupation, resistance and revenge. Two years after the invasion, Iraq is ruled by insecurity and daily violence. It was a fatal mistake to radically shatter the state machine, the military and the police – the result of a colossal misjudgement by the Pentagon. Reconstruction and democratic transformation must now be conducted virtually under war conditions. The people of Iraq may have been freed from a bloody dictatorship, but the country is now under an occupation regime whose mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners has been eloquently attested in pictures. The country has become a breeding ground for violence of different provenances. The agents of violence are using terror to fight against the establishment of a new system of rule supported by the United States. And the bitter irony is that the co-operation between al-Qaeda and supporters of the Saddam regime, which Washington once cited as the reason for going to war, now really does exist - as the result of the war and the occupation.

## **Steps towards democracy**

The Iraqi transitional constitution of March 2004 is among the most democratic constitutions in the Islamic world with its catalogue of civil rights and the ruling that a quarter of all members of parliament must be women. The first free parliamentary elections were an impressive demonstration of the political will of Iraqi men and women to exercise their democratic rights. The fact that 58 percent of those entitled to vote queued up in front of the polling stations - despite death threats against all voters issued by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi only a few days earlier and in spite of Sunnite calls to boycott the elections - belied the terrorists' claims to speak for the majority of Iraqis. It also refuted prejudices about the incompatibility of Islam and democracy.

But democratisation involves its own imponderabilities – the principle of majority rule, for example, can heighten ethnic and religious differences. As expected, the winners of the election are the Shiites and the Kurds, the majority of the Sunnis followed the boycott. The government alliance of representatives of the Shiite majority and the Kurds intensely angers the Sunnis, who formerly always had the say in Iraq. The suicide attacks, which have increased parallel to the formation of a new government, are spreading fear and seeking revenge for the election. So far, the highest blood toll was in May 2005 with over 700 dead and thousands injured. There is a chance of defeating the uprising providing that the politicians representing the Shiites and Kurds, the groups which suffered most under Saddam Hussein, continue to work together with a willingness to compromise and providing they succeed in integrating Iraq's Sunni Arabs politically. Recent statements by the US leadership that one must do everything possible to ensure the participation of this group, whereby military means were of little use, indicate that a learning process is underway.

The new government is to work on a new constitution and present this to the Iraqi people for approval; a new legitimate government is to emerge from parliamentary elections before the end of the year. At the moment, however, it looks as if Iraq is hanging in the balance. It remains to be seen whether the gentle power of the ballot box will really overcome the brutal violence of terror. That it should succeed is also in the interest of the sharpest critics of the Iraq war. We therefore welcome the Iraq conference to be held by the EU and the USA in Brussels in June. Here Iraq and its neighbours, together with the G-8 states, the World Bank, the IMF and the UN will draw up a concept for rebuilding and reform as well

as for security in the region. This Herculean task should also serve to inspire transatlantic co-operation.

Democratisation under military occupation is an almost impossible task, as Iraq is proving every day in such a horrific way. Critics of the war have warned about this. Nevertheless, we do not consider the demand for the immediate withdrawal of the American troops to be a peace option at the moment. Too great is the risk of Iraq's internal heterogeneity and the conflicting interests of greedy neighbours pushing the country into absolute chaos and destabilising the entire region. At the same time, we disapprove of Washington's expectations that soldiers from countries which were critical of the war should fill the dwindling ranks of the coalition troops in Iraq.

**Immediate withdrawal of the occupation forces?**

### **Sudan should not become a second Rwanda**

Whereas Iraq is struggling with the consequences of a change of government enforced by war, the escalation of violence in Sudan since the beginning of 2003 demonstrates the consequences of the opposite, of all too dilatory crisis management. For a long time, the community of states sought an effective strategy, whilst in Darfur an estimated 180,000 people lost their lives and almost two million were expelled from their homes. The diverse interests of important members of the UN Security Council prevented the UN from applying international pressure on the regime in Khartoum at an early stage and threatening sanctions if it failed to stop the actions of the Janjaweed militias. It was China which objected when the Security Council declared the war in Darfur to be a threat to peace and urgently called upon Khartoum to immediately disarm the militias. China defended the principle of state sovereignty, but it had also acquired large oil concessions in Sudan. The western states also held back all too long because they did not want to jeopardise the laboriously negotiated peace agreement for South Sudan. And so – according to the findings of a commission set up by the UN - the community of states was once again not in a position to put an end to crimes against humanity.

**UN Security Council obstructed from within**

In March 2005, the Security Council did at least decide to bring Sudanese war criminals before the International Court of Justice. We consider it a positive development that Washington agreed to this move despite its well-known reservations about the ICJ. However, this is hardly sufficient to contain the violence in Darfur. International pressure on the government in Khartoum and the SPLA is essential. We endorse the EU's plans *inter alia* to

provide military supervision to support the armed peace forces of the African Union. The AU's request to NATO for logistical assistance should be received positively and agreed upon with the EU. Europe's humanitarian aid for the people of Sudan should not be allowed to strengthen the position of the Sudanese government, but must benefit those who supported the peace agreements.

### **Signs of an easing of the tension in Kashmir**

We take a positive view of the easing of the tension between India and Pakistan in the Kashmir conflict. For a long time, this situation posed a serious threat as it involved two nuclear powers facing each other with deep-rooted animosity. One might be tempted to attribute de-escalation to the paralysing effect of the nuclear deterrent, which encouraged the realisation on both sides that wars can only be conducted at the price of self-destruction. In actual fact, however, it is more a paradoxical side-effect of US policy in the aftermath of September 11, 2001: Following the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan under President Pervez Musharraf has sided with the United States, not least in order to pocket considerable military and financial aid. In addition, the Kashmir conflict is devouring a lot of money and deterring foreign investors. Jihad terrorists and radical Islamic opposition groups, which the Pakistani secret service had formerly supported and used to fuel the Kashmir conflict, regard this co-operation with the United States as treachery and have made several attempts to assassinate the President. This has prompted him to embark on a confrontation course with the Islamic groups and to begin the dialogue with India.

### **Opening the borders**

This dialogue suits the new Indian government very well: India is trying to make its mark as a stabilising regional power, is supporting "change through trade" even more strongly than Pakistan, and is thus interested in easing the tension in the Kashmir conflict. Furthermore, de-escalation serves India's ambitions of gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Moving closer towards India is a dangerous balancing act for Pakistan, whose Islamic identity is its national *raison d'être*. But the two countries are speaking to each other, have agreed to forego nuclear tests, have relaxed border restrictions and are planning significant troop reductions.

### **Concerted intervention in Congo shows initial success**

Excesses of violence can be curbed successfully using concerted pressure. To speak of success may sound like a euphemism in view of the still large number of victims and the continued suffering of the civilian population in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). But, nevertheless, there have been successes and these have been the result of joint interventions by the UN, the EU and individual neighbouring states – this too one of the new, mixed forms of international crisis management. Together with the Congolese security forces (military and police) and supported by the EU, both financially and with advisers, the troops of the MONUC UN mission have succeeded in eliminating violent players in parts of the country. The increased strength of the MONUC forces signals a willingness to conduct “robust” military operations.

#### **Successes of robust military missions – the case of Congo**

These military operations are complemented by efforts to dry out the sources of finance which feed the economy of violence. The rebel groups finance themselves through illegal trading with Congolese raw materials. In order to make this trade more difficult, the UN published a document in 2003 stating the trading routes and the companies and people concerned in the North and the South. It is difficult to gauge the effects of such publicity. The same applies to the arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council, which has applied to eastern Congo since 2003 and was extended to the whole of Congo this May. Embargo-breakers are not only threatened with a travel ban but will also have their assets frozen.

The disarming of members of the militias, especially child soldiers, represents an important step for civil rebuilding. It is showing initial results, even if only gradually. Modest progress has also been made with regard to the rebuilding of the state: Parliament has passed a new constitution and preparations are being made for parliamentary elections.

### **Violations of human rights tolerated by the West – the case of Chechnya**

Contrary to Moscow’s interpretation, the second Chechen war is by no means over. Bomb attacks and armed skirmishes illustrate this almost daily without hitting the headlines. The rebels have adopted the tactic of guerrilla warfare, focusing on the south of the republic. Resistance in the cities mainly takes the form of terrorist attacks and is also directed against the civilian population. Poverty, lack of security, unemployment and absence of

prospects nourish extremism, radicalisation and violence. Radical Islamists are finding supporters particularly among the young.

At the same time, the Chechen people are being exposed to brutality at the hands of the Russian army and Moscow's security services, which are under the Ministry of the Interior or the Federal Security Services (FSB). Random arrests, the "disappearance" of individuals, torture, "extra-legal executions", rape and plundering are the order of the day. The notorious security forces of the pro-Russian Chechen government are also involved.

As far as all OSCE members are concerned, the serious violations of human rights such as those committed by Russia in Chechnya have not pertained "exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned" for a long time now. But the possibilities for direct and in particular short-term external influence are very limited. Moscow claims that the conflict is a civil war in which the Russians are not only fighting against Chechens but where they are also fighting with Chechen loyalists against rebels. The Chechen resistance, which has made its ugly mark with disgraceful acts of terrorism such as the attack on school children in Beslan in autumn 2004, is also making use of foreign helpers.

**Russia's  
Chechnya  
policy must  
be criticised**

Moscow is neither able nor willing to introduce a political and economic strategy of de-escalation. This was demonstrated most recently by the murder of the moderate Chechen leader Maskhadov. The dialogue between EU states and Moscow must therefore also include criticism of Russia's policy in Chechnya. The Federal Government has the least reason to avoid this subject. Relations based on partnership, which boast about their particular intensity and trustfulness, must be able to bear frankness and open criticism

## **2. Peace consolidation between security, development and democratisation**

The continuing excesses of violence in Iraq among others are drawing increased international attention to the problems of rebuilding and security in internal conflicts. Post-war societies such as in Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Indonesian province of Aceh or Liberia show that talk about peace processes often glosses over the actual situation. There are twice as many failed as successful conflict settlements; very often a relapse occurs in the first ten years after a war. Scenarios for putting an end to violence, de-escalation and stabi-

**Peace needs staying power**

lisation strategies, as well as the build-up of democratic structures are usually subject to a contradictory kind of dynamism: The different interplay between internal causes of conflict and players and external influences encourages divergent civil and military interests and reactions. The crisis management strategy of the community of states is only gradually adapting itself to steering these towards peace.

Wars and civil wars destroy resources, opportunities and values. It is therefore essential to do a lot of things at the same time in order to restore the protection and well-being of the affected population: Shattered infrastructures and transport routes, education and health systems must be rebuilt, shadow economies and economies of violence uncovered and brought under control, military goods, installations and personnel - and with them the tough “cultures of violence” - have to be converted and an accepted new security structure established. Post-war societies and weak, shattered, corrupt or fragmented states do not have the strength to do all this on their own.

**Target conflicts and dilemmas**

But external players are also faced with conflicts of objectives. Democratisation from outside, particularly through military intervention, has not been a successful strategy in the past. Only rarely does the western export of democracy fit in with local historical, social and cultural traditions. Initiatives towards democratisation in multi-ethnic societies can serve to further polarise existing conflicts and collective identities. In the same way, development and financial aid to finance public investments can enhance rivalry, clientelism, exclusion and suppression if it is not equipped with the necessary controls to ensure transparency. Finally, the urgent reform of the security sector, which includes the return of the state’s monopoly of power, can produce undesirable side effects, such as repression, violations of human rights, renewed militarisation or a return to autocracy.

As difficult as this may be to achieve, an integrated approach to promoting peace must regard security, development and democratisation as an indivisible triangle of opportunity. As well as observing political factors, it must also take into account the role of economic factors in violent conflicts, and in particular the control of resources. Just as transnational concerns have in the meantime begun to understand the relationship between security and development and thus their own responsibility in violent conflicts, the state departments and international donor organisations involved in peace consolidation should also expend more energy on co-ordinating their missions. In this context, we welcome the ideas of the

Federal Government's working group on "Civil Crisis Prevention" to make Nigeria a pilot project for German foreign and security policy.

### **Problems of civil-military co-ordination**

We also consider it necessary to take a critical look at the difficult interplay between security and development in those areas under the auspices of the UN which are increasingly involving so-called multiple missions comprising military and civilian components. Virtually unnoticed by the public, the *Bundeswehr* is in the meantime providing the second largest contingent of troops abroad, after the United States – with the difference that the German troops are all legitimised by the UN. Tasks in the field of stabilisation and training, such as the *Bundeswehr* is performing in Afghanistan or the Balkans for example, are intended to improve the immediate security of the population but do not always strengthen confidence in the work of the international aid organisations which is taking place under this protection – even less in Afghanistan than in the Balkans. Soldiers and civilian staff confirm that it is often all too difficult to delimit strategic objectives and different mandates. Complementary action by both sides with the visible division of tasks demands a new quality in the planning and co-ordination of such missions. Kofi Annan's proposal to establish a Peacebuilding Commission and a corresponding support office at the UN takes up this need and should be supported by the Federal Government.

### **Afghanistan: Mission impossible?**

The political stabilisation and initial democratisation of Afghanistan made progress in the course of the constitutional process and the presidential elections in autumn 2004. At the same time, however, there is a massive disparity between the UN mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to secure peace and the fight against terrorism using military means conducted by the US-led Enduring Freedom operation. The latter's tactical alliances with local and regional warlords, particularly in the south, are stopping the demobilisation, disarmament and civil integration of the militias and are also threatening to undermine the political and economic gains in the north. The cultivation of drugs, which along with their pay as mercenaries is the main source of income for Afghan farmers and at the same time the hub of international economic crime, is steadily increasing. According to UN reports, Afghanistan's opium production rose by 17 percent in 2004 compared with 2003, and the poppy-growing area increased by as much as 64 percent. Drug exports total almost three billion US dollars, approximately 60 percent of Afghanistan's Gross National Product.

**PRT man-  
date:  
Squaring  
the circle**

The Federal Government's latest report describes the dilemmas of the mission in Afghanistan: The dynamism of the drug problem is threatening to jeopardise all the progress achieved since 2001. But the German soldiers are not allowed to burn down the poppy fields. The military and civilian components of the *Bundeswehr's* mandate within the ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in the Kunduz and Feyzabad regions in the North West often seem like an attempt to square the circle. Aid organisations such as "Doctors without Frontiers" are afraid that the people of Afghanistan will reject their projects because they have the protection of the military, whereas the soldiers for their part often feel overtaxed by the twin civilian and military mandate. There is a lot of grit in the works of cross-departmental co-operation in this large-scale experiment of consolidating peace – at government level in Berlin as well as in the field of international co-ordination.

**The ISAF's  
development  
policy orien-  
tation**

It would be catastrophic if international support for the government in Kabul were to be reduced now. However, the financial willingness of the donors must be accompanied by a quick evaluation of the various political weaknesses of co-operation at military as well as civilian level. In view of the important role of the *Bundeswehr* in a future extended ISAF mission, the German Government should aim to ensure better co-ordination of international efforts in the fight against drugs. The ISAF mandate should not serve to censure conflicts by military presence alone, but must be used to give more space to development activities. At the same time, it is important at state level to try to solve the contradiction between securing peace, on the one hand, and combat operations, on the other, by cutting back the Enduring Freedom mission in favour of the ISAF with its focus on development policy.

**A mixed balance in the case of Liberia**

Liberia is a good example of the dilemmas facing civil-military missions. What is currently the UN's biggest mission (UNMIL) has been operating in the country since 2003 in an effort to implement the peace agreement which terminated 14 years of civil war. 14,000 blue helmets, equipped with a robust mandate, and several hundred police and civilian personnel from more than 40 countries are to disarm the opposing parties and prepare elections in the autumn. In addition, UNMIL is also to provide regional stabilisation aid to neighbouring Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast. So far, the balance of this large-scale international state-building exercise is rather mixed: On the one hand, it has improved physi-

cal security for most Liberians. On the other hand, lack of co-ordination in disarming, demobilising and reintegrating means that approximately half of the 100,000 former combatants are without work. They are tempted to hire themselves out as mercenaries in conflicts in neighbouring states. The transitional government is chronically under-financed, but is not doing anything to control Liberia's valuable diamond resources. It is thus perpetuating the causes of the conflict and obstructing prospects for development. The community of states must either extend the mandate or take up the proposals of the International Crisis Group to supervise the Liberian budget and set up a regional intervention force for the Mano River Union.

### **Assistance for democracy in the Balkans**

Unsolved questions of status, weak states, economic crises and hundreds of thousands of expellees waiting to return to their homes show that peace has still not come to the Balkans. Although the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina enjoy full democratic freedom ten years after the Dayton Agreement, their sovereignty still lies in the hands of the High Representative of the community of states. His wide powers are preventing the political elites from feeling responsible for the community as a whole. Only the transfer of sovereignty can change this situation. In the meantime, the majority of the population accept the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We therefore recommend a quick start to the gradual transfer of sovereignty.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina: Transfer sovereignty soon**

Dayton set the new direction for both European as well as German policy. There is now a willingness to safeguard peace settlements by military means. The EU has made progress in forging its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and has nominated a High Representative and set up independent crisis reaction forces. In December 2004, NATO handed over the command in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the EU. The aim is the comprehensive democratisation of the Yugoslavian successor states, including protection for the minorities, with the prospect of EU integration.

**The EU is capable of learning**

Despite continued military presence and enormous financial funds, it has not proved possible to persuade the two opposing population groups in Kosovo to co-operate. Nevertheless, everything indicates that this summer the UN Security Council will recommend beginning negotiations on the final status of Kosovo. The Amato Commission has drafted proposals for gradual transition leading to EU membership for Kosovo. As untenable as the current

entrenched situation may be, it is all the more important that no substantial concessions are made with regard to the criterion of democratic standards. The protection of minorities must be guaranteed and the minorities that were expelled in 1999 must be offered prospects for return. We therefore believe that the priority of “standards before status” should not simply be reversed. The perpetuation of ethnic segregation is unacceptable. The continuation of parallel education systems in Kosovo and Macedonia causes concern. The desolate economic situation, which is continuing to fuel the conflict along ethno-political lines, must be tackled more decisively with economic strategies which benefit all groups.

### **3. Settle conflicts, prevent new violence**

It is much better to prevent violent escalation from occurring than to control outbreaks of violence, place victims in rehabilitation programmes and rebuild destroyed communities. This also includes preventing conflicts from flaring up again after a cease-fire. There is an increased risk of the use of weapons wherever national security is guaranteed by means of armaments and military superiority. The vertical and horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is dangerous and unacceptable. The prevention of violence means stopping such weapons. There is a threat of violence spreading like wildfire wherever deep-rooted animosities between states or peoples are combined with social dynamite, such as in the Near East. In the medium and long term, bringing peace to the Near and Middle East, democratising the Arab states and reducing social imbalance in the countries of the South are all factors which will contribute towards the prevention of violence.

With its Action Plan for Civil Crisis Prevention, the Federal Government has begun to establish the prevention of violence as a cross-sectional task in its policies. This is a positive development. But what is still lacking are the necessary additional funds and the right innovative political approach. The international prevention of violence must take a central position on the agenda of national and international politics. This presupposes a broad exchange of information on critical developments and their respective potential for reaction, not only between the relevant ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defence, Economic Cooperation) but also with non-governmental organisations at international level. It also calls for the necessary resources and funds. We support the efforts of the Federal Ministry of

**The prevention of violence as a cross-sectional task**

Economic Co-operation to ensure that Germany meets its obligation to raise development aid to 0.7% of the Gross National Product.

### **External support for the negotiations in Palestine**

Hope seems to have returned to Palestine. The change of leadership in the fragmented Palestinian society took place far more smoothly than was feared. With Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinians now have a democratically legitimised president who has negotiating experience and is recognised internationally. Initial reforms of the political system and the security apparatus have been introduced. Supported by the legitimacy of a majority of 62 per cent, Mahmoud Abbas has ordered the security forces to prevent all forms of violence and has succeeded in involving sections of the radical groups in his negotiating strategy.

On the opposite side, Ariel Sharon is upholding his plan to evacuate the Gaza strip by the end of 2005 in spite of massive domestic protest. There is an – albeit fragile - cease-fire between Israelis and Palestinians. Is this merely a breathing space? The initiators of the relatively unsuccessful Road Map, the so-called Quartet, have both the power and the legitimisation to make clear to the protagonists the steps which are necessary to achieve first orderly co-existence and then a gradual legal solution to this centuries-old conflict. The key questions which require urgent agreement and answers that are acceptable to both sides were laid down decades ago: the return of the territory conquered by Israel in 1967, the fate of the Palestinian refugees and their descendants, and the status of East Jerusalem. The Geneva Agreement contains a draft solution to each of these questions. Inactivity on the part of the Middle East Quartet would mean that it was failing to meet its historic responsibilities. Steps must be taken to strengthen the commendable diplomatic initiatives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which are recognised by both Tel Aviv and Ramallah.

### **Implement the Geneva Agreement**

The Israeli and the Palestinian leaderships must liberate themselves from the clutches of the fundamentalist sections of their supporters, which are frustrating any opportunity for a permanent solution to the conflict by insisting on maximum demands that exclude a balance of interests between the two sides. Israel exists. It is absurd to want to turn back history and repeal the foundation of the state which was endorsed by the UN. The extremists on the Palestinian side must renounce such demands, not only by words but also by deeds. A state of Palestine does not yet exist: its establishment is long overdue. What is lacking,

however, is a united territory, which is capable of development, and agreement on the part of Israel. Both sides need a future in peace, based on firm treaties and with guarantees from the international community. This also implies willingness to participate in an international mission to monitor the peace process.

### **Regional arms controls in the Middle East**

An initiative on the control and disarmament of weapons in the region could provide the necessary support and prospects for efforts to enable a peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. Originally introduced before the UN General Assembly by Iran and Egypt in the mid-seventies and at least not torpedoed by Israel, the idea took its current direction in 1991: The Security Council declared that the disarmament obligations imposed on Iraq represented “steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery”. Admittedly, the tentative discussions between the Arab states, the Palestinians and Israel did not produce any results, but in the meantime it is clear that Iraq no longer has any weapons of this type, Libya is ridding itself of such weapons, and Syria has offered to conduct negotiations without preconditions. It is more imperative than ever that Iran’s nuclear ambitions should be included in an approach that is based on regional talks and settlements. In this regional context, one should no longer ignore the fact that Israel is the region’s only nuclear power. The negotiations should also take into account the nuclear-capable delivery systems of the American Gulf Fleet.

### **A nuclear arms-free zone**

There are two ways to contain the risk of war. These options are not mutually exclusive but complementary. On the one hand, the *détente* approach seeks *willingness* to reduce the use of force through confidence building. But this would still not completely eliminate the risk of war. Only when the means of conflict are brought under control and the *ability* to use violence is reduced is there an increased guarantee of preventing war. Saddam Hussein’s – wrongly assumed – weapons of mass destruction supplied the justification for the invasion of Iraq. The campaign has not put an end to mutual fears of threat in the crisis region, on the contrary. The arms control approach is thus attaining new topicality in the Middle East. Disarming under a policy of disarmament would be an alternative to disarming by means of war.

Arms control is an arrangement based on reciprocity. It buys the same advantages with the same obligations and offers the security advantages of co-operation in exchange for the risks of confrontation. A Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction would not begin with total disarmament. Initially, one would have to determine the area of application, the elements of the ban, the mechanisms for inspection and verification. We do not overestimate Europe's powers to take action and initiate this project. However, the geographical proximity of the crisis region forbids us from standing idly by.

### **Keeping nuclear weapons under control and disarming**

The large majority of the community of states shares the conviction that the proliferation of military nuclear technology should be prevented. They support the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which commits the nuclear weapons-free states, on the one hand, to not producing or acquiring such weapons and the nuclear powers, on the other hand, to reducing their arsenals. Various groupings of states have often argued that more importance should be attached to one or other of these two objectives instead of taking both equally seriously. This conflict escalated at the NPT Review Conference in 2005: Some nuclear weapon states, particularly the United States, did not want earlier commitments towards nuclear disarmament to be mentioned at all or only in a non-committal manner. This outraged the advocates of nuclear reduction, who saw themselves cheated of earlier negotiating successes. As a result, the Conference argued for three weeks about trivial formulations instead of bringing substance into the debate. This has weakened the NPT.

### **Prevent proliferation – advance disarmament**

In order to uphold and to once again strengthen the NPT, both the non-nuclear weapons states as well as the nuclear weapons states must commit themselves to nuclear disarmament and the containment of proliferation. Nuclear disarmament includes the enforcement of the test stop agreement, the beginning of negotiations on a cut-off, the renunciation of the development of new nuclear weapons, and the further reduction of nuclear warheads. Non-proliferation includes *inter alia* the internationalisation of the production of nuclear fuels, the implementation of the Additional Protocol and the protection of weapons-capable material against seizure by nuclear terrorists.

Double standards do not bring us any further. The only remaining super power cannot be allowed to commit others to non-proliferation whilst at the same time expanding its own

nuclear power. Other states are expected to renounce the production of nuclear fuel whilst the United States develops new nuclear weapons in violation of previous promises. All states are expected to sign the Additional Protocol whilst the United States refuses to ratify the CTBT, thus preventing it from entering into force. If nuclear weapons play such a prominent role in the security of the United States, it is no wonder that other states want to follow this example.

### **Iran and North Korea: Building confidence without double standards**

Currently there are only two problem states that are toying with the nuclear option, Iran and North Korea. America's policy against the "axis of evil" following the invasion of Iraq has drastically heightened the security fears of Iran and North Korea and has increased their striving for nuclear weapons. North Korea became the first country to leave the NPT in early 2003 and declared itself a nuclear power at the beginning of 2005. So far, the six-power negotiations to solve the crisis have failed because US President Bush, with his hands tied at home, has not put forward a serious proposal. The North Korean leadership appears to be using this situation to establish itself as a nuclear power. It is not clear how the further destabilisation and nuclearisation of North Asia can be prevented. Martial rhetoric only barely conceals the fact that the US Government has no plan of action. The situation is all the more serious as China rejects sanctions against North Korea.

**North Korea: Six-power talks blocked**

Iran's nuclear enrichment programme has triggered concern in the international community because it would enable the country to quickly develop nuclear weapons. Even if Iran does not yet have a nuclear weapons programme, the community of states cannot allow Tehran to introduce such plans. Great Britain, France and Germany are negotiating with the aim of committing Iran to abandoning its agenda. The United States is awaiting the result. Iran has suspended, but has not finally forsworn, its enrichment programme. Their joint interest in preventing the nuclear armament of Iran should prompt the United States and the Europeans to adopt a common policy.

**Iran: Pressing for a negotiated solution**

As one of the most important non-nuclear weapons states and as an ally of the United States, the Federal Republic is obliged to exercise a moderating influence on the United States and other nuclear weapons states. The Federal Republic can make a symbolic step towards the denuclearisation of security policy in its own area of responsibility: The tactical nuclear weapons still stored on German soil are politically anachronistic and obsolete

from the military point of view. Their owners should be asked to withdraw them. Fear of conflict in dealings with the United States would be contra-productive in the field of nuclear disarmament.

### **New arms race in space?**

Washington is working on a new directive on the weaponisation of space. An expensive and dangerous arms race lies ahead if the plans favoured by the Pentagon to attack and destroy targets in space are implemented. American press reports speak of the introduction of the first deployable systems as early as 2007. Their dependence on satellite-supported reconnaissance and communications technology would force other space powers to follow suit. The more the civilian infrastructure of an increasing number of countries depends on components in space, the greater the global imperative to renounce the active weaponisation of space. Only a complete ban on anti-satellite weapons can solve this problem. As current Chair of the European Space Agency, the Federal Minister of Research is in a favourable position to raise this topic at European level.

### **Democratisation in the Middle East**

Reform initiatives and conferences between Morocco and the Gulf states are evidence of the increasing awareness of the inevitability of comprehensive processes of modernisation, reform and democratisation in the Middle East. There is talk of a “fresh breeze” of renewal. Democratic elections in Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq have pointed the way ahead. Furthermore, following many years in which the media only played the role of government mouthpiece, the growing number of independent television channels – the most famous being al-Jazeera – are beginning to create a kind of Arab political public sphere. One could perhaps interpret Libya’s renunciation of weapons of mass destruction and its rapprochement with the West as the whim of its autocratic leader, but the murder of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri has started a political avalanche. The largest protests in the history of the country have effected the withdrawal of the Syrian troops.

### **A fresh breeze in the Arab region**

The EU and the United States share the political goal of working towards the comprehensive democratisation and modernisation of the Middle East, which is currently an unstable region riddled with war and civil war. At dispute are the means to this goal: Whereas the so-called Barcelona Process aims at long-term change through trade and co-operation,

Washington does not exclude the possibility of regime changes through military force. The EU must be interested in ensuring that the policy of democratisation which has begun in individual states in the region does not fail.

## **4. Political strategies and options for action**

### **Promoting UN reform**

The challenges involved in violent conflicts, in stabilising post-war societies and in international and transnational conflict prevention demand improved instruments to secure peace and new political strategies. Against this background, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has put forward proposals for the reform of key UN bodies which the UN General Assembly will consider in autumn 2005 at the Millennium + 5 Summit. The “A safer world” report, which a high-level panel of advisers has submitted to the Secretary-General, and the “In larger freedom” programme, which the latter presented in March 2005, are both characterised by a realistic analysis of the current threats and pragmatic recommendations for action.

We welcome the fact that the High-Level Panel Report focuses on civil crisis prevention whilst not completely ignoring military interventions. It establishes criteria for exercising the right of self-defence. According to the report, this right may also be exercised when an armed attack has not yet taken place, but is imminent. On the other hand, the report renounces self-defence where there is only an indirect threat of an attack. In such cases, it recommends that the matter be brought before the UN Security Council. This recommendation is directed towards the United States, which claims the right of anticipatory self-defence for itself if it feels threatened by weapons of mass destruction, even if only indirectly. We agree with this criticism. Such anticipatory rights create considerable legal uncertainty and open the door to abuse.

With regard to civil options for action, the experts demand that attention should be focused on the tasks of crisis prevention and post-conflict assistance and propose the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission. This proposal deserves strong support. It meets the priori-

### **Criteria for the right of self defence**

ties of the German Government's Action Plan for Civil Crisis Prevention and should encourage similar co-operation within the framework of the CFSP.

We are also encouraged by Kofi Annan's bold proposal to replace the current Human Rights Commission by a Human Rights Council. This has the advantage that the proposed selection procedure can exclude those states which trample on human rights.

Attention in Germany is focused on the reform of the UN Security Council. The High-Level Panel Report has put forward two detailed proposals in this field. Both models foresee the enlargement of the current Security Council with its 15 seats to include 24 members. Under Model A, the Security Council would be extended by six permanent and three temporary members, whereas Model B envisages eight semi-permanent members (two states each from Asia, Africa, Europe and America) and one temporary member. Neither model foresees a right of veto for the new members. Although Model B currently appears to have fewer chances of success, we consider it more suitable than Model A for enhancing the credibility of the Security Council and the legitimacy of its decisions. In addition, semi-permanent membership with a four-year election rotation would give states an incentive to show that they were "good performers" in as many fields as possible in order to commend themselves for re-election.

### **Security Council reform**

The Federal Government's aim of becoming a permanent member of the Security Council is understandable but it is still too much characterised by national parish-pump attitudes and power aspirations. We believe that it would make more sense politically if Germany were to co-operate in the longer term with the other European states with a view to EU membership of the UN and to then support the EU as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

The United Nations itself will not take over all the tasks on its agenda for reform. The regional organisations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter could be more appropriate for regional peace-keeping tasks, particularly for those involving conflict moderation and peaceful conflict solution. Classical organisations of this kind include the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). On the one hand, the significance of this organisation has diminished in recent years. The reasons for this are the decrease in the significance of European security policy compared with conflict areas outside Europe, the

### **Changes in the OSCE**

strategic shift of forces resulting from NATO and EU enlargement, and the conflicts between Russia and the western member states. On the other hand, the OSCE is currently undergoing extensive changes in its functions: It is more experienced than comparable organisations and more capable of taking pre-emptive action against transnational threats and designing long-term structures that can support peace in weak states. In addition, the large number of trouble spots along Russia's periphery disprove the assumption that a security organisation which is committed to the use of co-operative strategies and instruments is superfluous. Germany and other EU states must voice their criticism of Russia's lack of support for the OSCE.

### **Will a new constitution make Europe more capable of peace?**

Admittedly, the EU is not a regional organisation like the OSCE in the sense of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, it does have certain affinities with the UN in its programme and structure. The historical achievement of European integration is the fact that, after hundreds of years of war and imperial expansion, Europe has succeeded in giving inter-state relations a legal basis and thus ensuring peace. It is the common aim of the EU and the UN to replace the rights of the strongest by the strength of right

If it is to realise its ambitious aim of "freedom from fear", the UN will be more dependent on a united and powerful EU in future. But this is not the EU's strong point. EU enlargement with ten new members has deepened the gulf between the expectations placed in the EU and the latter's possibilities. The EU's economic power and integrative ability are not matched by corresponding unity in the field of foreign and security policy.

The controversial debate on the EU Constitution largely reflects the problems of internal consolidation, rather than deficits in foreign policy. It is precisely these deficits which France and Germany in particular wanted to overcome. This is also why the text of the Constitution contains commitments to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and pledges to improve military capabilities and establish a European Armaments Agency – not exactly classical constitutional topics! On the other hand, the draft Constitution lacks targets in the fields of disarmament and arms control, areas in which Europe has the advantage of considerable know-how and experience.

### **Controversy over the Constitution**

**Limiting  
military ex-  
penditure**

We reiterate our rejection of the idea that Europe can counter-balance the United States as a power through increased expenditure on armaments and additional military capacities. Such aims are neither realistic nor desirable. Worse still: They would be contra-productive with regard to the High-Level Panel Report as well as with regard to the additional needs for international funds to prevent crises, combat acute violence and restore civil order as emphasised by the Secretary-General. In the meantime, the United States accounts for more than 40 percent of world military expenditure (\$430 billion); the EU states share a further 25 percent (\$180 billion). In view of this concentration on a few western countries, it is essential that the EU uses its influence at the UN to advocate a departure from the trend of increasing military expenditures in favour of the priorities stated above.

The highly praised concept of extended security, which is also the basis for the European Security Strategy, contributes to this confusion when it mentions threats due to war, terrorism and transnational criminality in the same breath as problems such as poverty, epidemics, environmental catastrophes or the collapse of states, which must be seen rather as the indirect and complex results of uncontrolled neo-liberal globalisation. Military means are even less appropriate for dealing with the risks inherent in these problems than for dealing with terrorist violence or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is to be feared that the security policy guidelines of the EU Constitution will set the wrong course for the sensitive interplay between security and development.

**Battle  
groups: Ca-  
pability for  
military in-  
tervention**

Since December 2004, the EU has set up 13 so-called Battle Groups, national or international mobile combat units consisting of approximately 1,300 men each for operations outside Europe. Their equipment and weaponry are clear, but their mission is not. Battle Groups may rescue civilians from civil war situations, intervene between parties fighting in a conflict or put a stop to the activities of murdering gangs, such as seen in Rwanda in 1994. But they can also operate “in regional wars to defend European interests”, as stated in a draft paper by the Paris Institute for Security Studies on a White Paper on “European Defence” in summer 2004. At the moment, such a scenario would not receive either a UN mandate or a majority in the German *Bundestag*.

The German decision to participate in the (primarily) American MEADS air defence system is a further cause for concern. Mobile air defence systems are more appropriate to wars between states than to UN-led crisis missions. What type of missions abroad do they im-

ply? The roughly four billion Euros needed for development and procurement are a huge sum for the *Bundeswehr*, which has to make savings and whose weaknesses lie in the area of air transport rather than missile defence.

We consider it our duty to warn against adopting new conceptual directions which will lead to the abandonment of the EU's successful status as a civilian power. Even today, without EU co-ordination of arms and military capacities, existing restrictions on dealing with alleged security interests are being relaxed, be it in the interests of the arms industry or for reasons of power politics. The different messages issuing from the German Foreign Ministry and the Chancellor's Office demonstrate a lack of cohesion in the field of foreign policy and give rise to trepidation. By granting arms export licences to the People's Republic of China, the German Government is violating the EU arms embargo and is damaging the credibility of Germany's purported restrictive arms exports policy.

**EU must remain a civilian power**

We are afraid that German foreign policy is not sufficiently committed to the priority of civilian crisis instruments and would therefore like to emphasise the following tasks in particular in this year's Peace Report:

- The next German government should not shelve the Action Plan for Civil Crisis Prevention but should expand it and provide it with the necessary funding. This concept, which is based on the strengths of the civil society, deserves replication at European level: A corresponding EU agency could prepare the way for meeting the growing demands of civil crisis prevention. This would correspond to the demands of the United Nations that the EU should engage more actively in this field.
- We consider other proposals for the reform of the UN far more important than the permanent seat on the Security Council demanded by the Federal Government, for example the new Human Rights Council or the Peacebuilding Commission. Germany and the EU must throw their weight behind the security and development policy objectives of UN reform in September and set a good example within the framework of the Millennium Goals. Germany must ensure the increase in its development aid to 0.7 percent of its Gross National Product. If the laments about failure to take action in Rwanda are to bear fruit, the same must also apply to the expansion of those military capacities which enable timely and effective intervention in situations involving genocide.

- The disaster in Iraq and the instability of the Middle East region, which is critical not only for its people but also for all industrial societies, demand concerted peace strategies which unite development, democratisation and security. This is also a challenge for the new joint transatlantic strategy.
- The EU and the so-called West must return to a co-ordinated, far-sighted policy of arms control and disarmament. This is imperative if they are to be able to credibly demand the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons-free zones and arms controls in the Middle East and elsewhere.

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