

Editors' Comments:

Current Developments and Recommendations

1. The revolutionary awakening in the Arab world

A historical turning point

Goal:
liberation

Anyone who had predicted the revolutionary awakenings in the Arab world six months ago would have been ridiculed. In retrospect, it seems as if the time was ripe. Enough explosives had been built up: repressive autocrats who had been in power for decades were neither capable of nor willing to modernize their countries. A young population had access to information that another kind of life was possible but despite education they had no prospects for the future. Now hundreds of thousands loudly demanded what the famous square in Cairo promises: Liberation.

The starting signal was the self-immolation of the young college graduate Mohamed Bouazizi of Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia. This set off massive protests which ultimately put the hated ruler Ben Ali to flight. That spurred movements critical of regimes that are still going today, from Morocco to Bahrain and Syria. They might even be able to revive the Middle East peace process after Fatah and Hamas could no longer ignore the demands of the Palestinians to overcome the split.

In Tunisia and Egypt the military gave the demonstrators free rein and so contributed to the rulers at the top stepping down. In Tunisia there is a chance for a new political order with more participation and individual freedoms. That Egypt's Higher Military Council bowed to the revolutionary movement and decided to put Mubarak on trial gives hope that it will permit the opening of the country to freedom of opinion and the rule of law.

Pressure
and
resistance

In Syria and Saudi-Arabia, however, pressure from the street was met with resistance; both countries increased the repression. In Bahrain, Saudi-Arabia rushed with soldiers to help the regime, while the shocked potentates are trying to take the sting out of the protests by announcing social services, financial benefits and political reforms. However, they have not yet been able to quiet the protesting people down. The end of the Arab autocracies is still uncertain. Neither the security apparatus nor the old elites have been

disempowered. Nevertheless the revolutionary awakening represents a turning point. “Such a phenomenon in human history is not to be forgotten” wrote Immanuel Kant after the French Revolution, and even when there are setbacks, the memory of this will “be roused to a repetition of new efforts of this kind.”

People’s
power

The fascination and the broad appeal of the freedom movements in Tunisia and Egypt are based on the fact that they demonstrated the real power of the people to drive seemingly all-powerful autocrats out of office. This experience was conveyed – also thanks to the new media – well beyond North Africa.

We have a
say in their
future

Many of us would not have believed the Arabs could tear down the walls of fear. Yet the revolutionary masses challenge the legend of Islamism as the only relevant opposition in the Arab countries, as well as the allegations that Islam is not compatible with individual rights to freedom. They force states and societal actors in the West to radically revise their policies with respect to Arab societies. Stability cannot be achieved *à la longue* through cronyism with repressive autocrats. Certainly, every revolution runs the risk of devouring its own children. But we are more than just observers. We share, through our policies, in the decision of whether it will come to this or not. The anxiety about destabilization and floods of refugees is not a prudent advisor. The hopeful movements of awakening deserve every possible support.

The intervention in Libya

Protect the
civilian
population

In Libya, the peaceful protests ended in a bloody civil war. Its outcome is uncertain. Militarily dramatically inferior to the armed Gaddafi troops, the rebels called on the UN for help. Because the Libyan state did not protect its people but, rather, went after them with military might, the UN Security Council, referring to Article VII of the UN Charter, in its Resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011 authorized Member States to use “all necessary measures” to protect the civilian population while “excluding a foreign occupation force of any form”. There were no dissenting votes; however, Russia, China, India, Brazil – and the Federal Republic of Germany – abstained. Two days later a “coalition of the willing”, led by France, Great Britain and the USA, began bombing positions of the

Libyan army. On 31 March, NATO took control of all military operations. The UN Security Council had already imposed an arms embargo on Libya and along with that, called for assets of Qaddafi and his family to be frozen. In addition, it authorized the International Criminal Court to investigate the suspicion of crimes against humanity.

The goal of the intervention was to prevent a massacre by Gaddafi's brutal security forces and mercenaries and that was achieved with the protection of the city of Benghazi. But the bewildering progress of the fighting raises complicated questions. The aspired regime change overstretches the principle of protecting the civilian population. What happens if an incalculable escalation of the fighting can no longer guarantee this? We warn against the risks of a blurring of the boundaries of war. The resolution forbids occupation forces, but when do other intervention forces, such as ground troops, become occupation forces? Such worrying questions are also being asked by the Libyan rebels who normally insist uncompromisingly on NATO support. During a visit to Dublin in mid-April, representatives of the National Transitional Council from Benghazi warned the EU against securing humanitarian help with ground troops. That could split the opposition, endanger Arab support and in this way play into Gaddafi's hands. Military support of relief measures would also require a request through the UN Coordination Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

From week to week, the military intervention shows ever more clearly that the goal of the UN Resolution and the intention of the interveners to bring down the regime are difficult to reconcile. Resolution 1973 demands an immediate ceasefire. That ought to be taken seriously and the parties to the conflict must be persuaded to start negotiations, without political preconditions, because the protection of the civilian population takes priority.

Europe's shared responsibility

First and foremost, the autocratic rulers and their security apparatuses are responsible for the suppression, lawlessness and kleptocracy as well as the societal and political stagnation in the Arab countries. However, the international economic and financial organizations as well as the European States have contributed to the misery: The

No
occupation
forces

Failed Medi-
terranean
policy

International Monetary Fund and the World Bank exacted neoliberal-inspired economic reforms that destroyed the traditional subsistence economy of the agrarian sector, retail and small trade, and wiped out jobs. The same holds true for the EU's agrarian and fishing policies, as did the export and investment practices of European businesses that propped up a small economic elite in the Arab countries, who did not give a jot about the widespread poverty. The exclusionary migration policy of the EU States obstructed the life prospects of young people who saw no future at home. The EU States have made themselves accomplices to repressive regimes with political deals whereby autocrats and dictators deliver oil and gas, intercept refugees in exchange for cheap credit and weapons. Thus there are also moral grounds for an about-face. It demands a new Mediterranean policy oriented to human welfare as well as an asylum and migration policy that is bound by the Human Rights Charter.

2. Europe in crisis

Euro crisis

The crisis of the Euro is far more than a currency crisis. With the collapse of *Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc*, unleashed financial market capitalism threw the world economy into a severe crisis in September 2008. Suddenly, banks were dependent on massive state support. The trust in the self-healing powers of the market was just as shaken as the reputation of the finance branch. That the tax payers had to rescue banks – which had previously been high earners – from bankruptcy, damaged the legitimacy of our social system. Yet the highly speculative finance sector was not put in its place. Almost every effort to correct its deregulation failed.

The Euro crisis aggravates the disintegration tendencies

Excessive
hesitation

In Europe the currency and economic union is showing deep cracks. Greece, Ireland and Portugal had to be rescued from state bankruptcy with the help of a 750 billion Euro-strong rescue umbrella. After much too long hesitation, the emergency fund of new loans and bond rollovers is limited until 2013 and requires the “recipient countries” to

undertake draconian cuts in social services, cutbacks in public service and in government investments. With this, the EU accepts recessions in its needy Member States.

The burdens of the financial crisis are not being carried by the parties that have caused it – banks and lenders – but rather by the population; feelings of impotency and the erosion of solidarity are fostering scepticism and rejection of European integration. National egoisms take the upper hand and favour populists; the Europe-wide rise of right extremists is striking. But instead of putting all the energy into the completion of the currency union through a coordinated economic and finance policy, European heads of state allow national interests to prevent a serious discussion about creative rescue instruments such as effective financial market regulation, the outlawing of certain financial products, a transaction tax or Eurobonds. With joint bond issues and mutual liability, the financially weak states could again have access, with tolerable conditions, to the capital market and be able to catch a breath for their protracted recovery without totally jeopardizing social peace.

The national resentments and exit fantasies that returned during the Euro crisis triggered speculations that the common currency would fall apart. But politically, much more is at stake: A failure of the Euro could endanger the existence of the European Union. Its reversal back to a free trade zone would be linked with unforeseeable risks.

The congenital defect of the Euro was grounded in the ambition to create a common currency without a common economic policy – a far reaching omission of the Maastricht Treaty. It was assumed that all members would observe the red line of the stability pact intended to limit the deficit and national debt. An effective mechanism to implement this was not created. Thus the common currency came into conflict with national budget, finance and social policies and extremely diverse competitive capabilities.

A failure of the Euro would undermine attempts at a European social and employment policy, bring with it the reintroduction of fluctuating exchange rates and a return to protectionism, would polarize societies and increase centrifugal forces. A general decline in solidarity would revive the struggle for spheres of influence and undermine the still-rudimentary common foreign policy once and for all. Therefore, we appeal to the

National
egoisms
prevent a
solution

Exit fantasies

political parties, but also to societal powers, unions and academics to reinforce their involvement for integration. With good cause does a prominent passage in the German Basic Law say that Germany, as an equal member of a united Europe, should serve peace in the world.

Turning away from proven multilateralism

For months, the Federal Government and parties acted without a European political perspective although Germany and its export industry – which sells almost two-thirds of its overall exports to EU countries – profits enormously from the Euro and from integration. The reverse side of the debt overload and current trade and account deficits of some southern Euro countries is one’s own export and current account surpluses. In the German Federal Government almost no one dared to say this clearly. With the next parliamentary elections in mind, it tried to make the public believe that it was sufficient to preach to the debt-ridden countries in the Euro-zone water instead of wine and to recommend Germany as a model. Financial aid is inflated to a national sacrifice of the Germans. Effective European multilateralism has given way to national egotism and self delusion.

Late turn-around: European solidarity for solidity

The shift came only at the end of 2010. Those who had long clung to the *no-bail-out* clause and demonized any kind of “transfer union” were forced to see that this was insufficient. The German government conceded that the common currency could not be stabilized without intervening in countries’ sovereign rights. Berlin and Paris suggested a “Competitiveness Pact”, which then mutated into a “Pact for the Euro”. Now the common currency demands European action in cash: one is liable for the other for which one requires a rigorous budget and social policy. *Contre coeur* the one commits to European solidarity, the other to solidity.

This is less than joint economic governance, but means the end of every sovereign finance and budget policy that the German government had previously defended so stubbornly. But how should countries that could barely avoid state bankruptcy, manage the drastic reforms demanded of them in only two years? Even after the EU summit of March 2011, there are no effective mechanisms for control of the banks, early warning systems and a government investment, interest and tax policy to effectively balance out the weaker states' need to economize. The European governments must actively justify the necessary balance between rich and poor countries as common interests and campaign for political support. Solidarity is not only a burden: European integration is good for everyone.

Integration
benefits
everyone

The push for integration demands more democracy

The „Pact for the Euro“ thus represents one of the thrusts for integration forced by the finance markets, so that state budget, finance and social policies will, in the future, be subjected to European control. However this is carried out as “open coordination” by the European Council, i.e. by the heads of state and government. Deciding on a wide-reaching novelty of this sort, without complying with the envisioned procedure of double legitimation, indirectly through the Council *and* directly through the European Parliament, exacerbates the democracy deficit in the EU. That there remains for the national parliaments no room for negotiation over decisions taken elsewhere, “must erode any democratic credibility” (Jürgen Habermas) and strengthen the existing reservations against the “bureaucracy” in Brussels.

Deficits in
democracy
exacerbated

While one encounters lobbyists from the 27 member states at every corner in Brussels, at the level of national states, pro-European facilities, associations and pressure groups are, by contrast, weak. Pressure groups, parties, unions, citizen initiatives, environmental, women's and peace groups should confront the European policy failures of those in power with their own initiatives in order to strengthen the collective European will again.

Strengthen
European
wills

The elites' old EU-project has failed. In order that the citizens no longer perceive the EU as a burdensome or even a threatening juggernaut, future European election campaigns

must address topics that actually involve common decisions: the jobs market, social, health and pension policy, energy turnaround, migration and international cooperation.

The European peace project needs a credible new investment

Berlin seems to have forgotten the axiom of German foreign policy, which used to be multipartisan: the involvement for European integration justified after 1945 by responsibility for the past. For decades it created an unshakeable guard rail, from the Chancellors Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl right to Gerhard Schröder's Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. German European policy must be reliable for the neighbours – that was *the* lesson from the historical catastrophe which resulted from Germany's striving for Great Power status in the 20th Century. We expect from parties and government that they resist populist temptations and pro-actively represent the European Project in public. Germany must find its way back to the pacesetter role for a united Europe.

The European migration societies

Parallel to the Euro crisis, a wave of xenophobia is washing through Europe. In many European societies, populists aim for election success with racist, frequently anti-Muslim, propaganda and the stigmatization of migrants. In Germany, Thilo Sarrazin, using his blend of biological and cultural suppositions, declared Islam to be an absolute hindrance to integration; the discriminatory labelling of “young Turks who are education-averse and prepared to use violence” stuck with its poisonous impact. The pseudo-scientifically dressed-up resentments have a chilling effect on the social climate and erode societal norms such as tolerance, justice and solidarity. While Brussels adopts useful papers about the necessity of migration, and while the Lisbon Treaty completes the communitization of migration, the European States lag far behind with its creative implementation.

For many EU States, immigration is ultimately an economic necessity against the aging of their societies. But the fact that since 2006, Germany has had a negative migration

Germany's
respon-
sibility

Immigration
is necessary

balance, above all of qualified people (*brain drain*), and that since 1994, more than half a million more citizens have emigrated than have immigrated is largely unknown. The frequently trouble-free daily life in migrant communities does not make headlines either; rather, the vision of a supposed onslaught of “foreigners” dominates. When the new Federal Interior Minister, as his first official act, contradicts the Federal President by saying that Islam is not a part of Germany, and when heads of states in Berlin, Paris and London give notice at the same time that the notion of “multiculturalism” has failed, we cannot but wonder what contact they have with reality. Islam *is* a part of Germany; Multiculturalism is a societal reality. Entire branches of the economy would break down without the services of immigrants, not to mention how much poorer culture, gastronomy, sports and entertainment would be without them.

Diversity is
an asset

National and societal diversity are part of European identity. So we must make an effort to see that cultural diversity and the right to differences are recognized as normality, even as an asset. We suggest creating, in a politically pro-active way, a brain-gain-for-all-

Brain gain
for all

strategy that promotes the disadvantaged with and without a migration background as well as well-qualified immigrants and that opens up opportunities in the job market here and in their homeland. We suggest promoting this with appropriate instruments; educational and training policies are our central addressees. Increased advancement of children with migrant backgrounds in the educational system is an integral part of this, beginning with the energetic expansion of child care facilities and kindergartens and the further qualification of and improved salaries for teachers as well as a simplified accrediting process for university and professional diplomas earned abroad. New recruitment strategies and arrangements for foreign university graduates to stay should be linked with development impulses to sustainably improve professional opportunities in the countries of origin. We call for a reform of the naturalization law and the granting of residency and work permits. We definitely need more progressive voices from civil society, business, churches, unions and the government against xenophobic populism and electoral politics on the extreme right, but also a clear-cut policy for implementing the jointly agreed-upon goals in the EU.

Education
against
populism

EU dissonance vis-à-vis Libya

National
go-it-alone
policies

In the cacophony of the EU states with respect to the Libyan crisis, the deficits of the European foreign policy became more than clear. Domestic political parameters determined the foreign policy dealings of the EU States and national go-it-alone policies still dominate. Re-nationalization and populism, which already impacted the Euro crisis, continue: Nicolas Sarkozy dreams of a new *Grandeur*, Angela Merkel and Guido Westerwelle cater to the aversion of the majority of Germans to military deployments.

German
abstention

The Federal Republic of Germany abstained from the vote in the Security Council on Resolution 1973. We criticize the government's behaviour as a serious foreign policy mistake, but justify this differently: Some of us criticize that Berlin failed to strengthen the UN and did not attach sufficient weight to the protection of the civilian population; in addition Germany opposed its Western allies and nurtured the misperception that it could follow a national foreign and security policy alongside of the European one. This is no way to strengthen either European unity or collective security, which underscores the impression that German foreign policy is currently resistant to all advice and is breaking with decades-long continuities. Others of us sound the warning that the Libyan intervention could be the start of a "slippery slope", could set off an incalculable military escalation and could fail in achieving the primary goal of the intervention, namely protecting civilians. Seen in this light, it is not Germany's abstention which seems to have been a mistake but the absence of any proactive diplomacy, be it for a rapid ceasefire in Libya or for the ambitious goal of European unity.

Good
reasons for
military
restraint

This is no peace-oriented foreign policy. We do not share the fear that Germany will decline in "political size" or influence through military restraint, for which it has good reasons. It should not try to emulate France and Great Britain. Germany can and should distinguish itself through active diplomacy, economic cooperation incentives and military restraint, which includes the strict observance of the legally binding but, unfortunately, often contravened prohibition of exporting weapons to areas of tension or to states which violate human rights.

Diplomatic dilettantism

In the case of Libya, Brussels proved itself unable to build on the diplomatic success of 2003/2004 which had led to the reintegration into the community of states of the somewhat chastened despot Gaddafi – withdrawing from the business of terror and renouncing nuclear weapons. The mediation efforts of Turkey should, for example, have garnered more support. The cooperation agreement for over 50 million Euros, cobbled together in October 2010 by the Union’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, under which the EU wanted to let Gaddafi organize border protection and the “management” of the flow of migrants, is only scarcely less scandalous than the French Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie’s offer – who, meanwhile, has stepped down – to rush to help the Tunisian dictator push back against the protestors with the know-how of the French security forces. These agreements speak volumes about the false priorities of European Mediterranean policies.

Cronyism
with
despots

While the UN has focused militarily on Libya, there is a sense of helplessness in all Western capitals about how the escalation of violence in Syria should be confronted. The sanctions imposed by the EU are a step in the right direction. Germany could and should use its good contacts with Damascus, whose economic and administrative reforms it is supporting, to dissuade the regime from shooting at peaceful demonstrators. It would be smart to win over Turkey as a partner for this. Genuine readiness for reform can scarcely be expected from the Syrian regime and its repression apparatus, which owes its strength also to the frozen state of the Middle East conflict. But de-escalation would already be a success.

For a new Mediterranean policy

“The EU makes security policy and views the Sea as its ally. The Sea is the “Ex” of the border security agency FRONTEX.” Heribert Prantl’s sarcastic commentary goes to the heart of it: The European “space of freedom, of security and of law”, much trumpeted in Lisbon, shuts out the people outside – the *European Dream* is not meant for everyone. The border control system, geared to walling off, falls apart when the contract partners on

Lampedusa:
scandal and
shame

the other side are no longer prepared or able to cooperate. Europe's cheering over the pursuit of freedom and the rebels' courage contrasts shamefully with the scare tactics triggered by the 26,000 refugees on Lampedusa – one for every 20,000 EU citizens! Tunisia alone took in 160,000 refugees.

Control
Frontex

Up to now, the Frontex practices have remained largely uncontrolled. We call for the border security authority – who with a budget of 88 million Euros is well in funds and who is represented by 265 employees in all EU states – to finally be placed under the control of the European Parliament. The Lisbon Treaty has given the parliament more say; this should now be used in the interests of the refugees. The Members of Parliament must have insight into the work of the border security agency. At the same time, the EU migration policy must be revised in consensus with the future North African regimes. Every asylum seeker has a right to a serious review of his application. The practice of shipping those seeking protection back to their homelands, with the help of bilateral agreements, violates the EU Constitution and the Human Rights Charter.

Prevent
revision of
Schengen

When Silvio Berlusconi goes so far as to compare refugees with tsunamis or Nicolas Sarkozy wants to suspend the Schengen Agreement to get rid of them, a return to common sense and humanity is urgently needed: easing the procedures for visas and a redistribution of migration within the EU, as the 2001 Council Order for Emergency Situations envisages. We appeal to the German Minister of the Interior to defend this in Brussels and to resist the revision of Schengen. Political morality ends neither at the national nor at the European borders.

Solidarity of deeds

Support
Arab
societies

It is not separation but solidarity that is today's imperative. The support announced for the Arab freedom movements must quickly be followed by deeds. Europe has some transition experiences to offer the Arab societies: It can consult on drafting new constitutions, on designing key state institutions and reforming the security sector, it can give targeted support in the area of economic infrastructure and in establishing free unions, in the reform of the educational system from literacy to the establishment of free

universities and the advancement of women. With its political foundations and countless non-governmental organizations, Germany and other European states have tried and tested instruments and experienced people at their disposal in the countries affected.

It is high time to clean up the skewed threat scenarios. The long-time fixation with transnational terrorism has resulted in relying on the precarious stability of the existing autocracies. But it is just exactly their brutal suppression of all efforts at emancipation which makes an ideal breeding ground for militant Islamist tendencies and terror organizations such as *al-Qaeda*. The Arab upheavals can herald new international economic relationships and are an opportunity for jointly developing human security. The European raw materials strategy should be adapted in a way that ensures that stability and development are strengthened in the states which are extremely dependent on the export of raw materials, rather than placing one's own economic interests above all. The EU should aim to play a trailblazing role in introducing and abiding by business standards which benefit the raw materials exporting countries and their populations. And EU agricultural subsidies should finally be rolled back: The EU must open its agricultural markets so that desperately needed jobs come into being in the Mediterranean states. In addition, we repeat the old demand: No weapons deliveries to autocratic regimes!

Re-structure
economic
relationships

Crisis Management à la CFSP: No lack of structures but of common policy

The attempt of the EU to create instruments for civil and military crisis management with its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has taken shape since 1999. The labyrinth of structures, staff and cells was bundled in December 2010 into the European External Action Service (EEAS). Did this development also heighten the EU's profile as a "peace power"? Our balance turns out to be mixed.

EU as a
force for
peace?

Within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), transformed last year into the CSDP, the EU has involved itself since 2003 in 24 civilian, police and military missions: in the Balkans, in the southern Caucasus, in the Middle East, in Africa and Asia. Most of the deployments served to train the police as well as to reform the security sector and justice. In addition, there was the monitoring of borders and

ceasefires. Missions took over tasks that were originally military in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in Chad, on the Horn of Africa as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina; most extensive was Operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia with, at times, up to 7.000 troops deployed.

With its missions, the EU established itself as a security policy actor to be taken seriously. Deployments in the Western Balkans but also in the Aceh Monitoring Mission (2005/2006), as well as the presence in Georgia after the war of 2008 contributed to stabilization and building trust. In Kosovo, the EU missions were in a position to promote the rule of law against the widespread criminality but did not achieve very much. Unfortunately, these activities get less political notice than military operations which, as a rule, have only been able to quiet the situation for a short period, such as, for example in the East of Congo (Artemis, 2003) or to ensure the elections in Kinshasa (EUFOR, 2006). In Chad (EUFOR, 2008/9), the ESDP appeared primarily as the agent of France. Concerns about whether *Operation Atalanta* off the coast of Somalia (since December 2008) to protect trade ships with soldiers of the Bundeswehr is covered by the constitution have not been cleared up. We criticize that combating piracy militarily has not contributed to eliminating its causes.

Priority for a civil foreign policy

The shifts in the international power constellation, connected with the rapid rise of new great powers, have led to calls in Europe growing louder for the EU to further develop into an independent power in order to be able to keep up. But there are structural reasons why it cannot become a European superpower. In the military area, the lack of statehood and the pressure to compromise set narrow limits. In addition, there are good normative grounds to reject this goal: Instead of furthering the peaceful order envisioned in the UN Charter, it would lead back to the concert of powers of times past.

The EU should concentrate on what it does best: soft power through development policy, economic integration, diplomacy, crisis prevention and post-conflict care. Its strategy not to secure peace through strength, balance of power and efforts to become superior, but

Evaluate
missions

No super-
power,
but soft
power

rather through interstate cooperation and transfer of sovereignty is a success story. This applies beyond EU borders. Germany should use its entire political weight in the EU to this end.

The EU and Turkey – partners or competitors?

A particularly sad chapter is Turkey's practically cancelled accession perspective since 2005. Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy do not trust the democratization and eye the dynamic economic development under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with suspicion. In addition, both of them cater to domestic resentments against Turks. Turkey, for its part, is turning confidently to other partners in the region.

If the EU wants to achieve more influence in the Middle East, it must return to trusting cooperation with Turkey. This requires holding firm to their accession candidacy. The formula of "privileged partnership" propagated in Berlin does not do that. This rebuff not only violates the existing treaties and decisions of the EU, but it is parochial politics.

The perspective of an EU accession clearly promoted democratization in Ankara. With its geopolitical position, its multidimensional diplomacy and as the strongest regional power with an Islamic tradition, Turkey can function as the bridge between Europe and the Middle East. For many Arab freedom movements, the Turkish link between Islam and democracy is a model. Thus it seems to us that a change in course in the EU's Turkey policy is urgently needed: back to the path contractually agreed to and forward in the direction of a new Mediterranean policy.

3. Interventions without end?

Tangible withdrawal prospects for Afghanistan

The wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq have determined the peace and security policy debates for a long time; the past year was no exception. The *International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF) has meanwhile taken over the *Counterinsurgency* (COIN)

Pacta sunt
servanda

strategy, which integrates political, diplomatic and development aspects in combating the insurgents.

More
casualties in
Afghanistan

This strategy demands a high price. In 2009, the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) had already spoken of the “worst year for civilians” in light of the 2,412 dead, yet in 2010 the number of casualties rose to 2,777. COIN subordinates civilian and social courses of action to military goals. Although many Afghans fear that the withdrawal of the ISAF could destroy much progress, above all in the cities, the majority meanwhile rejects the foreign troops as occupiers. The reputation and the legitimacy of the Karzai government have also not improved – quite the contrary. During the Parliamentary elections in October 2010, the election commission declared almost a quarter of the ballots cast to be counterfeit. The negotiation initiatives to date include violent actors, but not those forces characterized by their civil engagement or their contribution to development.

The USA has given up its very ambitious normative demands in Afghanistan. Barack Obama has announced the beginning of the withdrawal of the US troops for June 2011; the USA is now concentrating on strengthening the Afghan government with money and military resources and by marginalizing or co-opting local rulers. At the same time, they are conducting a war with drones in the Pakistani border regions – the area to which the insurgents in Afghanistan withdraw – which can scarcely be justified under international law. The rulers in Islamabad criticize it openly, but secretly signal their consent.

Explosive
situation in
Pakistan

The political instability in Pakistan is – as we forcefully noted two years ago – even more dangerous than in Afghanistan. Since then, Pakistan’s explosive unpredictability has increased. The murders of the governor of Punjab in February as well as of the Minority Minister, Shahbaz Bhatti, by violent Islamist criminals in March 2011 are witness to that. Both of them had turned against the blasphemy law that carries the death penalty for defaming the Prophet or the Koran. Even more shocking than the two murders themselves is that they met with hardly any criticism but rather, to a great extent, triggered jubilation, a sign of the advanced Islamization. Although Pakistan – a nuclear power, hostile to India and shaken by conflicts in the Punjab and in Balochistan, but also by the massively increasing violence of the Taliban – belongs at the very top of the

international priority list, no kind of convincing strategy is on the horizon. Vast sums of American military help have not been able to fill this gap, but rather add to the instability. We expect that after the death of Bin Laden, the opportunity for a diplomatic offensive towards the Taliban will be used to stop the war in Afghanistan.

The German government has never clearly defined its goals in Afghanistan and the situation of the Afghan people has never been the focus of a debate. The deployment of the Bundeswehr has long since been de-coupled from the peace prospects for Afghanistan – if it ever was linked to it. While at first, it served an unlimited solidarity with the USA, after 2003 it compensated for Germany's rejection of the war in Iraq. This model is continuing after the Libyan deployment: As the abstention on UN Resolution 1973 was met with strong criticism in the West, the German government held out the prospect to NATO of AWACS aircraft in Afghanistan. Opportunism instead of strategy! We criticize this as amateurish and inconsistent, because the government still cannot coherently explain the purpose of the military deployment.

Meanwhile, Germany also shares the goal of withdrawing all international combat troops. We welcome the fact that for the first time in December 2010 the Federal Government issued a comprehensive "Afghanistan Progress Report". Thereby it complied with a call made a long while ago – almost ten years after the start of the deployment! Indeed, it remains their secret what justified the title. In addition, the report gives no concrete date for the withdrawal. We call for a publicly available evaluation of the Afghanistan deployment, as well as its individual components, by independent experts and consider a rapid withdrawal of the Bundeswehr to be unavoidable.

At the same time Germany should seize new diplomatic initiatives for the pacification of Afghanistan. Since the war in Afghanistan cannot be ended without the involvement of the neighbouring countries, we repeat our suggestion of an international negotiation process. This must include serious initiatives for regional ceasefire agreements in order to credibly link a withdrawal perspective to the goal of ending military violence. The experience of the CSCE in Europe has taught us that it is possible, despite opposing interests, to come to an understanding about rules and procedures for common security.

War without
a clear goal

Substantiate
withdrawal

Initiate
regional
ceasefires

Declining violence in Iraq but continuing fragmentation

Burdens of
the war

The “imperial intervention” in Iraq brought down the regime but failed to achieve all the other goals. It incited political instability, ethno-regional and religious conflicts as well as Islamist terrorism in the region. The war exacted a high price. Estimates of the death toll range from a hundred thousand to several hundreds of thousands of people. From the beginning of 2007 until the beginning of 2011, however, violence in Iraq declined by more than 90 percent. This reversal of a trend succeeded because the jihadists and al-Qaeda isolated themselves after violent militias had dissolved and transformed themselves into political actors. The social base of the insurgents had been successfully removed. Prime Minister Maliki temporarily strengthened national elements at the cost of ethno-confessional positions. However, after the Parliamentary elections of 2010, he again intensified cooperation with the Shiite parties in order to stay in power, which led to a re-ethnicization. Neither the withdrawal of US combat troops by August 2010 nor the renaming of the intervention to *Operation New Dawn* could take away the burden of the ethno-religious fragmentation of the country.

Stabilization through the UN and Responsibility to Protect

UN respon-
sibility to
protect

Countless UN stabilization operations stand in the shadow of the attention to the two military interventions led by the USA. They mark a comeback of the UN peacekeeping that appeared to have become meaningless after the spectacular failures of the missions in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia during the 1990s. However, the UN, under its Secretary General Kofi Annan, was not willing to leave civil wars and violent domestic conflicts to their own devices. A significant factor in this was the consensus which had built up in 2005 under the name of *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P) – as a reaction to the failure of the international community in the Rwanda and Srebrenica genocides. If a state commits genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, the international community is called upon to take over responsibility and to protect its citizens. The novelty is that in such a case, the protection of human rights takes priority over state

sovereignty. Germany can contribute within the UN Security Council to strengthening this developing norm of the responsibility to protect, which, alongside of diplomacy and humanitarian aid, also allows the use of force, including military intervention, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is a civilizing step forward when bloody suppression practices of dictators are no longer protected by the immunity of state sovereignty. If, however, this norm is arbitrarily used, it loses its credibility. Therefore we call on the Federal Government to develop criteria for its voting behaviour in the UN on military interventions as well as on Germany's participation in them.

More than 100,000 blue helmets – but a sobering balance

As part of the *Responsibility to Protect*, but also in the course of the debate on *failed states*, the number of blue helmets deployed world-wide has increased from 38,000 in 2000 to nearly 100,000 in 2011. Currently, three quarters of the UN soldiers deployed are stationed in the Sudan (Darfur and South Sudan), in Ivory Coast, in the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as in Haiti. All five deployments are furnished with a robust mandate; the European states are only marginally involved in these UN missions.

The *United Nations Mission in Sudan* (UNMIS) monitors the 2005 peace agreement and especially the referendum of January 2011. Although it only got going with great effort and is not considered very effective, it has been able to quiet the situation down. By contrast, the *African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur* (UNAMID, since 2007) has contributed very little to the protection of human rights and the containment of violence. The *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo* (MONUC, since 1999) has also not noticeably improved the situation of human rights in the east of the country

The deployment of the *United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire* (UNOCI, since 2004) has remained controversial. It did not prevent war and massacres after the elections that it certified. As the troops, with the help of French combat units, intervened in the power struggle between the incumbent Gbagbo and the elected president Ouattara, they did so in an expansive interpretation of their mandate to protect civilians. In the Caribbean, on the

Do not
apply norms
arbitrarily

Modest
success of
UN-missions

other hand, the *United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (MINUSTAH, since 2004), after a weak start, was able to improve the security situation but following the earthquake in January 2010; they were, nevertheless, subject to harsh criticism by the population over their transgressions and their being overwhelmed.

So the comeback of UN peacekeeping missions has met with only limited success, a sobering balance. Four factors are decisive for this. First, the parties to the conflict were not prepared to observe the political and military agreements. Second, the blue helmets were mostly dispatched after considerable delay: The mandate process drags on, governments sending troops are hesitant about the high risks for the lives of their soldiers and, to some extent, logistics are lacking. The UN troops are, all in all, poorly equipped anyway. So, for instance, UNAMID waited two years in Darfur for 18 helicopters. Third, the mandates are frequently vague or inappropriate. In Haiti, a conventional approach to disarming, demobilizing and reintegration was unable to achieve much against the actual violent actors: armed criminal groups. Finally, the blue helmets have damaged the authority of the world organization through inappropriate violence and misbehavior such as sexual abuse, forced prostitution and human trafficking.

Wrong-
doing of
UN-
soldiers

We urge the Federal Government to contribute to enabling the UN peace missions to better meet the requirements. Despite all the UN-friendly rhetoric, fewer than 300 Bundeswehr soldiers have been deployed in the stabilization missions of the UN; the majority of the some 6,900 German soldiers abroad are deployed under the command of NATO. With respect to mission and capabilities, however, the North Atlantic military alliance is no substitute for the UN peacekeeping. This is particularly the case for Sub-Saharan Africa. A NATO “world police force” in which the former colonial powers are represented meets with a great deal of mistrust here. With the *United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon*, the EU deployed European troop contingents. Contingents of the *European Maritime Force* (EUROMARFOR) were also integrated into the *Maritime Task Force* which has been under Italian command since 2008. The Federal Government should advocate that such EU contingents increasingly be deployed within the UN framework. Germany can work actively within the UN Security Council to reduce deficits, especially in the missions provided with a mandate within the framework of

NATO
cannot
replace the
UN

Two-step
mandating

Chapter VII. It should insist on unambiguous mandates and speed up the process of their implementation. The problem of the “sending gap”, i.e. the arduous search for sufficient numbers of blue helmet contingents, can be encountered by a two-step mandate process: In the first step, on the basis of a temporary mandate, the available resources would be surveyed; the second step would then be the conventional mandating through the UN Security Council.

Civilian crisis prevention, smart sanctions and consolidating peace

Improve
legal review
of sanctions

The necessary discussions about UN military deployments should not push the instruments of civilian crisis prevention, sanctions and consolidation of peace into the background. Here, the Federal Government can build on earlier initiatives. At the end of the 1990s, Germany, Switzerland and Sweden initiated an international debate on smart sanctions. The signal that they send is often effective even though not very strong and more likely mid and long-term. Moreover, they raise a number of problems concerning international and European law. Negative experiences must be evaluated. In addition, the possibilities for those affected to get legal protection from international and national courts should be expanded.

Support
Inter-
national
Criminal
Court

Germany significantly advanced the establishment of the International Criminal Court. That the UN Security Council referred the Sudanese President Al-Bashir to it is witness to the fact that the international community today no longer tolerates war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Admittedly, the case also shows that a political effect may temporarily not be forthcoming. We call on the Federal Government to defend the International Criminal Court against critics and to energetically support it morally, materially and with personnel. It is a historical achievement on the way to replacing the law of the strongest through the strengthening of law in international relations. This civilizing goal must remain the significant guiding principle of German foreign policy.

Strength of
law
instead
law of the
strongest

The USA was able to achieve an important success in combating international terrorism, when it located Osama bin Laden in his hiding place. However the chance was missed to take the leader of *al-Qaeda* prisoner and put him on trial. That would have served the rule

of law principle and would have been a civilizing act after the battle against terrorism was, for over a decade, connoted with “war” and overshadowed by the torture practices of Abu-Ghraib und Guantanamo

4. Militaries power weapons

NATO after Lisbon: old wine in new skins?

NATO over-
stretches
itself

In the new multipolar world, NATO finds it increasingly difficult to redefine its scope against existing limits. The Alliance's new Strategic Concept lacks both orientation and vision. In the core area of defence and deterrence, the document lists – in addition to the classic territorial defence – international terrorism, cyberwar and energy security. That is overdoing it. The Alliance understanding of crisis management avoids a clear cut between stabilizing missions and interventions. Under the term of “comprehensive security” NATO claims responsibility for areas which are genuine elements of development policy and diplomacy.

Employ
capacities to
strengthen
the UN

We criticize the fact that for NATO, the UN, in addition to the EU, Russia and others, functions only as one among many “partners”. This arbitrariness does not do justice to the role of the world organization. As the highest level entity the UN alone has the right to authorize military deployments of NATO that go beyond self-defence. Although formally committed to the goals of the UN Charter and to the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council concrete suggestions, however, are lacking for how the Atlantic Alliance can use its capacities to strengthen the UN. The new NATO concept places collective defence center stage but, at the same time, blurs its meaning. The possible gains in security, which the Alliance hopes to achieve with a European anti-ballistic missile defence system, are nullified by new dangers: Moscow, which is yet being courted rhetorically, might want to compensate for the missile defence of NATO with its own missiles – a revived edition of the old paradox of strategic defence from the 1980ies. That the Russian leadership is using this topic for domestic image-polishing does not release NATO from *its own* responsibility.

Missile
defence is
a wrong
signal

We consider the planned deployment of the missile defence system the wrong signal because it counteracts confidence building with Europe's neighboring regions. Russia is part of the "common house of Europe"; obsolete security dilemmas should not be revived. The missile defence remains, therefore, an unnecessary stumbling block *en route* to more security, which can only be reached jointly.

With respect to nuclear and conventional arms control and disarmament, as well as non-proliferation the Alliance lacks both the unity and the will to create momentum. The Japanese atomic catastrophe was an imminent reminder to us to do all we can to banish from the earth the risk of every single use of nuclear energy.

Implement
Global Zero

Even more than for its civilian use, this applies to nuclear weapons for which the actual intention is mass destruction. We call on the politicians of NATO and especially of the EU member states, to implement the vision of *Global Zero* with serious steps towards nuclear disarmament. NATO could make the most effective contribution to disarmament by limiting its own military capabilities; in light of its military superiority, such self-restraint would be advisable anyway. Rather than falling back on outmoded power projections, the EU states, France and Great Britain should lead with a good example and start reducing their nuclear potential.

Bundeswehr reform: insufficient

The draft

The abolition of the draft, which we have urged for a long while in the Peace Report, is a historic step for the Federal Republic of Germany. By contrast, the planned structural changes, intended to complete the process of adaptation to current NATO planning and military tasking within the framework of the EU, are not.

We criticize the report presented by the structural commission „Vom Einsatz her denken. Konzentration, Flexibilität und Effizienz“ as being technocratic and insufficient for a new direction of the Bundeswehr. The diagnosis – on oversize and structural defects of the Bundeswehr – essentially does, in fact, apply. For a long time, we have urged reductions in the defence budget as well as public and parliamentary consultation on the role of the

military. That the troop strength will now be reduced to 180,000 soldiers, of which 15,000 can be deployed at any one time, of course only rectifies cosmetically the current imbalance between a manpower strength of 250,000 of which, at most, 7,000 soldiers are ready at any one time for deployment for missions abroad.

Against breaking taboos

With the background music to the Bundeswehr reform we hear reclaiming of national interests, such as energy and resource security, to justify military action. Drawing upon recommendations from business circles to also deploy the Bundeswehr in the future for the welfare of German companies, the former German Minister of Defence zu Guttenberg argued for addressing the link between economic interests and military missions “openly” and “without inhibition”. We call for a clear distancing of the Federal Government from this breaking of a taboo. This is not compatible with a Parliamentary Army in which the goals and mandates of military deployments are subject to the control of the Bundestag.

We consider unacceptable the practice of systematically deploying young officers in political instruction in schools and in the training of student teachers. Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, North-Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Saxony have contractually agreed to such cooperation. This new practice is aimed at increasing the public acceptance for military missions abroad and the armed forces as such – a prerequisite that is inevitably required in the recruiting of a volunteer army. As much as discussing the role of the army may belong as a topic in peace education, soldiers should no way become actors in the instruction.

The Federal Republic with its tradition of military restraint has been well-served with the principle of „inner leadership (Innere Führung)“, and the concept of “citizens in uniform (Staatsbürger in Uniform)”. This concept has played a crucial role for the societal acceptance of the Bundeswehr in the past. We doubt that these principles will be compatible with the new ambitions of armed forces reform as long as they derive from

No military
for business
interests

No
Bundeswehr
advertising in
schools

Maintain
proven
concepts

the demands of the Alliance which have mainly grown out of the military interventions of recent years.

Security – comprehensive but precarious

The increased blurring of the boundaries of military tasks has a lot to do with an expanded understanding of security that does not precisely differentiate between risks, dangers and threats. The expansion of the term security originally had another intention: it aimed at moving the overall protection from physical and social injury – in the sense of “human security” – to the center instead of considering insecurity only in the context of war and violent conflicts. This expansion of the term though had an unintended flip side: since the military happens to come with more and better resources and equipment, its deployment often seemed reasonable, and even unavoidable in cases where civilian tasks needed to be managed, i.e. in safeguarding humanitarian tasks in crises and conflicts.

The military
for civilian
tasks?

Thus the debate on the width of security, on the one hand sharpened the understanding for the limited appropriateness and effectiveness of military measures, but also lent a new dynamism to the military security policy. Out of expanded security came “cross-linked security (Vernetzte Sicherheit)” in the German White Paper of 2006 or, in NATO jargon the “comprehensive approach”. The complementarity of military and civilian roles is, however, not innocent: it is extremely difficult to find a common denominator for military and civilian approaches for crisis management and consolidation of peace – armed forces, diplomacy and development help – and, at the same time to maintain the necessary clear cut.. Combating the insurgents in Afghanistan shows, in an exemplary way, where the supposed complementarity opens the door to instrumentalizing civilian tasks and activities for military goals. Thus we criticize the policy observed since 2010 in the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of increasingly aligning the promotion of development projects with the deployment areas of the Bundeswehr and make the readiness for civilian-military cooperation a prerequisite for funding.

Cross-linked security under scrutiny

The concept of *comprehensive approach* should be scrutinized. Within the framework of the oft-cited coherence of different approaches and political departments, we call for clearly separating again civilian and military tasks and mandates in dealing with crises and conflicts. The overexpansion of external interventions has to be reversed for the sake of *local ownership* and for the rebuilding of post-war and post-civil-war societies local civil society capacities must be vigorously strengthened. The export of western democracy models with the help of military interventions cannot succeed, as the Afghanistan example has proved.

No intervention army

We object to the transformation of the Bundeswehr into an intervention army, subtly begun since the Federal Constitutional Court's judgment of 1994, which now is to become institutionalized. We are insistent that deployments of the Bundeswehr that go beyond the defence of country and allies require a mandate of the UN Security Council. The blurring of military missions as expressed in the term of "expanded country and allies' defence" should not open the door to self-empowerment of military deployments. The deployment of the Bundeswehr must orient itself to international law; loyalty to the NATO Alliance must not undermine the monopoly of the UN to authorize the use of military force. Now that the public discussion of the war in Afghanistan has finally picked up speed, this debate must be expanded to the future role, tasks and format of the Bundeswehr. This debate is overdue. It is a precondition for being able to decide, seriously and democratically, about the scope of personnel, equipment and the financial framework of the Bundeswehr.

Conduct a debate on the Bundeswehr

Margret Johannsen

Bruno Schoch

Corinna Hauswedell

Tobias Debiel

Christiane Fröhlich