

Summaries

1.1. The crust breaks open. Protests, resistance, revolts in the Arab world (Muriel Asseburg)

For decades, North Africa and the Middle East have been seen as regions of conflict, their regimes, however, have largely been considered stable and adaptable to changing circumstances. This stability was symbolized by rulers who had been in power for 20, 30 or even 40 years. Around the turn of the year 2010/2011, mass demonstrations against the regimes gave impetus to a change which led to the fall of the rulers in Tunisia and Egypt. The protests combine social, economic and political demands – progress in all three areas is seen as imperative to enable a life in dignity. The Arab regime elites, for their part, quickly geared up to limit or brutally suppress the protests. However, the measures taken thus far will not be sufficient to put a lasting end to the protests and to maintain the regimes in their current forms. Nevertheless predicting the end of the autocracies at this point would be premature.

1.2. Revolutions 2.0? – On the role of the media in the political change in the Arab world 2011 (Carola Richter)

The use of the Internet has significantly increased in the Arab world in recent years. And there has been even stronger growth in the mobile phone sector. At the same time, with the introductions of blogs and social network services, the possible applications for both media have multiplied. The new media played a significant role in the upheavals in the Arab world at the beginning of 2011. However, the Internet is not *per se* a catalyst for revolutions. For actors who challenge the political regime and want to work towards societal change, it is of considerable importance to be able to transmit messages beyond the networks activated in the informal sector. The upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya showed that an interlinkage of the Internet, mobile phone and mass media was needed. Of even greater significance was the boosting of the informal media through the pan-Arab satellite stations al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya.

1.3. The failure of the EU Mediterranean policy (Ulrike Borchardt)

The revolutionary upheavals in North Africa came as a surprise for most Europeans and a positive reaction of the EU to these events, comparable to the fall of the Iron Curtain, took a while in coming. Instead, anxiety prevails: about uncontrollable changes in the Mediterranean region, a drastic loss of power, radical Islamists and a flood of refugees. Europe's Mediterranean policy failed because of its inherent contradictions. Its programs aimed for reforms in the partner countries but its actual policy was primarily oriented to its own security interests as well as smooth energy imports and for this, it put up with cooperation with autocratic regimes. The goal of sustainable stability requires long-term and reliable support for democratic change which is not achievable without a fundamental correction of the current EU Mediterranean policy.

2.1. *“Never forget: Europe is the future for us all – we have no other” (Bruno Schoch)*

Last summer the stability of the Euro was at stake as the debt overload of Greece became known. This evoked the danger that the European Union could fall apart. The government failed to counter anti-European resentments and rampant re-nationalization. But that is just what would have been necessary to ensure that no doubts about the continuity of the German European policy arose. With the cacophony in the case of Libya, Europe was even more at a dead end. The on-going Euro crisis then forced Berlin and Paris into a “Pact for the Euro”, which promises European solidarity in exchange for solidity. It significantly encroaches on national sovereignty while reinforcing the lack of democratic legitimacy. The EU as an elite project appears to have reached its limits, which is why the political class but also civil society, the public and scholars need to give the European peace project new impulses.

2.2. *From debt overload and Euro turbulence to a crisis in EU integration? (Heinz-Jürgen Axt)*

For about ten years, the Euro was considered the model success of European integration. But by 20 October 2009 at the latest, when the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou admitted that his country had gotten into debt well beyond the limits permitted for eurozone countries, serious turbulence followed. The doubts about the Euro substantially affect the European project of sustainably securing peace and prosperity through a deepening political integration in a region that was, for centuries, enmeshed in wars. Should the Euro fail, it is to be feared that nationalistic forces would strengthen populist and extremist tendencies that could fundamentally threaten European unity. The resulting economic and political disintegration would affect not only the EU states but also the countries in the neighbourhood. The European integration project would no longer be a reliable anchor for stability and prosperity.

2.3. *Conflicting goals of immigration: What is missing in the European Dream? (Corinna Hauswedell and Sabine Mannitz)*

In Europe, the topic of immigration has been taken hostage by a disturbingly radicalized populist debate. Although immigration and integration take place and are shaped very differently in the various EU states, stigmatization and racism have dramatically increased in many places. In Germany, the Sarrazin debate revealed how little cultural diversity and solidarity are accepted as a model for a *European Dream*. Once an alternative concept to requesting assimilation, integration today is characterized more by expectations of adaptation than by opportunities for participation. European values and human rights standards are being challenged if consensus about building a fortress Europe – see Frontex – seems easier to reach than providing health and offering equal chances. In the global competition for brain gain, national parochialism and small-mindedness dominate. This lack of commitment to the acceptance of immigration and the shaping of its societal consequences are problematic from a peace policy perspective.

2.4. *Between secularization and religious identity: Islam as a challenge and enrichment for Europe (Verena Brenner)*

In connection with the immigration of Muslim migrants and the religious plurality associated with this, there are countless challenges for the European self-concept and the historically-developed secular state order in Europe. Central to this is to what extent “the” Islam is compatible with the secular European state order. The way in which the diverse debates over the building of mosques throughout Europe have been handled illustrates the lines of conflict and the related insecurities. On the side of the “majority society” threat perceptions dominate. The increasing significance of xenophobic and rightwing populist parties makes clear that the EU states have reached the limits of their own tolerance with respect to Muslims. At the same time, Muslims with a migration background want more recognition and integration as a matter of course. This article shows the commonalities and differences with respect to this, throughout Europe.

2.5. *Security of supplies at any price? Europe’s hunger for raw materials between anxiety about shortages and the need for cooperation (Christiane Fröhlich, Lena Guesnet and Marie Müller)*

Europe is extremely dependent on imports of raw materials. The German and European raw materials strategy reflects this. The political support of the economy ranges from trade to development to defence policy. The continuous and, if possible, unlimited access to raw materials is increasingly stylized as a security problem. However, the aggressive tone in the discussion about limiting Chinese exports of rare earths and the competition for the raw materials markets in Africa raise the question of whether it is not more the reckless policy of free access to raw materials which endangers global human security. For example, the European debate omits any discussion of the way in which one’s own course of action impact the countries whose raw materials are exploited. Politics and economics must arrange raw material supplies in a way that is sensitive to conflict and in cooperation with the countries whose resources are exploited.

2.6. *The EU as a global player: Between re-nationalization tendencies and superpower fantasies (Matthias Dembinski, Harald Müller and Carsten Rauch)*

The EU or, more precisely, the “European union of states” system is under pressure from two forces pulling in opposite directions. The one power axis points back to the familiar and orderly structures of the nation-state; the other points ahead: to the apparently bright future of a unified foreign and security policy actor – the EU – which enters the world stage as a superpower. Both forces feed on the disillusionment and disappointment over the “Maastricht system”, in particular from three sources: a great potential for power, the limited global influence of the EU compared to that potential, as well as the apparent lack of transparency, limited efficiency and resistance to reform of its institutional structures. We go into all three sources, but show that the limited influence and readiness to reform of the European foreign and security policy is due, first and foremost, to the inadequate quality of the political leadership.

2.7. *Neither global competition nor effective peacemaking: What can the EU achieve in Central Asia? (Anna Kreikemeyer and Elena Kulipanova)*

Under the label of promoting stability and security, the European Union, as a global actor, projects its peace strategy of democratization, economic development and multilateral cooperation on Central Asia, among others. Long-term, it could have success with this, but currently there is a large gap between its approach and the security problems in the region. Stability in Central Asia still depends on authoritarian rulers who are frequently enmeshed in nepotism, corruption and organized crime and prefer to work with Russia and China. If Brussels' desire for power and peace is not going to shatter on the European periphery, it needs a sharper EU peace policy profile. It should implement its peace policy more believably on-site, involve Russia in it and strengthen the OSCE with more commitment.

2.8. *Turkey and the EU: Two partners going astray? (Burak Çopur)*

Turkey is currently trying to make its mark in world politics. Its increased international perception is thanks to – among other things – the democratization process advocated by the EU between 1999 and 2005. Since the opening of the accession negotiations in 2005, however, relations between Ankara and Brussels have gotten into troubled waters. Both sides are apparently coming to terms with this development. While the EU is quarrelling over the Turkish question, Turkey is trying to position itself as an independent power in the Middle East region with the concept of “strategic depth”. Here, it is not unimportant from a peace policy perspective whether Ankara seeks allies in Russia, China, Iran, or in the Arab region. A renewed focus on Europe in Turkish foreign policy could succeed through a clear membership prospect from Brussels. If, however, the EU does not want to offer this prospect, it would also be a missed opportunity for the European peace project.

2.9. *Quo vadis EU: Peace power or military power? (Hans-Georg Ehrhart)*

The EU is involved world-wide in crisis management. In its self-concept, it functions as a power for peace, without, however, making the term more precise or conceptualizing it. The EU treaty names its normative bases: peace, democracy, rule of law, human rights, but also safeguarding fundamental interests as well as the independence and integrity of the union. In recent years, the EU has created instruments for civil and military crisis management which lean towards making possible a holistic peace policy approach. However, the analysis of CSDP missions shows a gap between the approach proclaimed and its realization. On the one hand, the various driving forces seem to contribute to the EU developing in the direction of a peace power; on the other hand it is faced with enormous challenges, and its military weakness as well as political dissension, especially in violent conflicts such as in Libya, is regretted.

3.1. Military interventions and stabilization missions – A critical interim balance (Tobias Debiel and Nils Goede)

The failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda caused scepticism in the mid 1990s towards intervention and military stabilization and led to their temporary decline. At the beginning of the 21st Century, however, a wave of interventions – to some extent massive – began. The balance is sobering. The Iraq involvement – illegal under international law – has left a politically fragmented country behind and in Afghanistan the counterinsurgency strategy caused a high number of civilian victims and marginalized civil society actors. Three quarters of the 100,000 blue helmets world-wide are involved in UN stabilization measures. Yet the concepts often do not fit the local conditions as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast and Haiti show. Inadequate effectiveness can only be rectified if western states contribute with personnel and logistics. Although the international community has claimed a responsibility to protect, very serious violations of human rights are not unusual. Beyond that, the norm can be misused for the goal of regime change as shown in Ivory Coast and, most recently, Libya.

3.2. War or peace perspectives? The intervention in Afghanistan (Conrad Schetter and Janosch Prinz)

Since the winter of 2009/2010, the intervention in Afghanistan has been shaped by the *counterinsurgency* strategy (COIN) of the *International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF). COIN – according to the central argument of this chapter – is caught up in countless contradictions and projects unrealistic notions with respect to the Afghan society. In the strategy drafts of the interveners on the future of Afghanistan, the polyphonic expectations of the Afghan population and elites are underrepresented; and the drafts largely exclude the regional dimension despite avowals to the contrary. In the light of the prevailing paradigm of COIN, the Afghanistan policy of the international community in general and of Germany in particular ultimately raises the question of how far it is actually concerned with peace in that country.

3.3 Iraq – Balance sheet of a failed military intervention (Jochen Hippler)

The Iraq war split the West like scarcely any other conflict. War and the toppling of Saddam Hussein led to civil war and armed insurgency against foreign troops viewed as occupiers. Eight years after the invasion, the country is politically fragmented and divided into different zones of influence. Attacks destabilize the situation and undermine the security of the population. The USA has made serious political errors: It saw ethnic and religious categories, for instance, as determining factors for the “representativeness” of political forces – and thereby contributed to the ethnicization of Iraqi politics. With an eye to the expected withdrawal of US troops at the end of 2011, it has become clear: the military intervention was an anachronistic, imperial adventure characterized by an astonishing lack of planning.

3.4 *Sudan: Interventions light? (Elke Grawert)*

Since 2005, the international community has been involved in two peace missions in Sudan. UNMIS is monitoring the peace agreement reached between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A in South Sudan. In 2007, UNAMID was authorized to curb the ongoing violent conflict between the government and armed resistance groups in Darfur. In addition, a warrant against the incumbent Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir, who is accused of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, was issued by the International Criminal Court in 2009. The balance of the involvement is sobering. The two peace missions have largely failed in their primary task of protecting the civilian population. The international arrest warrant has actually led to a stabilization of the president. And even when South Sudan becomes independent after the successful referendum in January 2011, overall, the country is still a long way away from a consolidated peace.

3.5 *Intervention in Côte d'Ivoire – A recipe for disaster (Andreas Mehler and Franzisca Zanker)*

Despite the internationally recognized election victory of Alassane Ouattara in the presidential election in *Côte d'Ivoire* in November 2010, his opponent Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down. For months, the country had two presidents. Attempts at negotiations by African politicians did not help much. As a result, Ouattara called on ECOWAS for a military intervention. This article examines the possible consequences from the background of experiences of international interventions in *Côte d'Ivoire*, the inner Ivorian power relationships as well as the scope of the tasks and comes to the conclusion that an armed intervention would probably have led to a civil war and the military adventure would have turned into an intervention with no end. Also the military “solution” of the crisis by the Ouattara camp did not come about without massive external help and it is questionable whether, without the military support of France, Ouattara can rule in Abidjan and deal with such problems as forming a government, coming to terms with the serious crimes of both parties to the civil war and the symbolic emancipation from France.

3.6 *Haiti: The limits of external statebuilding (Julia Schünemann)*

International actors intervened massively in Haiti in the 1990s. However, after countless peace missions, UN Security Council sanctions and extensive aid funds, the Haitian state is still not functional. Corruption permeates politics and the elites have no interest in reforms. The inadequate effectiveness of the interventions is attributable to a number of causes: The UN missions were short-term measures dominated by external interests; international sanctions had very little impact; financial contributions fluctuated considerably. Conceptually, the external actors ignored the fact that Haiti does not have the conventional civil war parties but is characterized by organized crime and the transnational drug trade. External statebuilding was limited to promoting democracy through elections. Only if there is a balance among the political forces will this country – lately weighted down by earthquakes and cholera – have a chance for the future.

4.1. Military power for order and security? (Margret Johannsen)

Military build-up, armed forces orientation and security concepts in the world of states show that the realpolitik paradigm of militarily-backed power politics dominates and a concept of order that seeks a balance of interests and cooperation, as well as non-violent conflict resolution, can only moderate the so-called realpolitik in a limited way. The intervention in Libya confirms this finding. It took place with reference to the Libyan government's non-compliance with the responsibility to protect its population, was based on a UN Security Council resolution and justified an expansive military deployment. This flexible mandate was employed, under the formal umbrella of international legitimacy of the military deployment, for an external agenda, such as intervening on the side of the rebels, arming and training them, as well as regime change.

4.2 The new Strategic Concept of NATO (Matthias Dembinski and Hans-Joachim Spanger)

The new Strategic Concept of NATO only formally bridges the various interests of its members and thus offers little orientation. It does not provide answers to the question of the future nuclear role of the Alliance. In addition, some of its core statements are problematic from a peace policy point of view: the hegemonic connotation with which NATO presents the concept of cross-linked security, the interpretation of risks to energy supplies and IT networks as military threats, as well as the stronger emphasis on collective defence. If NATO underpins its promises of support for the new member states with military measures, there is a risk of renewed strain on the relationship to Moscow. The new cooperation rhetoric is, up to now, without concrete cooperative projects. If Russia is not involved in the planned European missile defence project, this could cause a renewed break with Russia.

4.3. Bundeswehr reform – Technocratic optimization in a space of unlimited military possibilities(Sabine Jaberg)

The Bundeswehr reform is said to be historic. The basis for this judgment is very weak. Only the abandonment of the draft is completed. To be sure, with its report the structural commission has presented a programmatic document for the reorganization of the armed forces. But the work on the details, quite apart from the implementation is yet to be done. Without a security policy analysis, without an evaluation of the foreign deployments to date and without reflection on the permissibility of the use of force, the efforts at reform are nothing but a groping in the dark. They amount to a technocratic optimization of the military instrument – and in fact in that space where politics and the constitutional court have very nearly blurred the boundaries in recent years. From a peace science perspective, what is needed is not a course correction but an about-face in the security and defence policy.

4.4. The maritime arms build-up of the emerging powers: Strategic and peace policy implications (Jan Grebe and Christoph Schwarz)

Currently, the states of Brazil, India, China and South Africa are operating on the world's seas in a new role. Extensive maritime arms build-up and modernization programs are intended to serve economic interests, the strengthening of their own position in the international system as well as an increase in international prestige. Weapons exports from EU and NATO member states contribute to this trend. While, on the one hand, global challenges such as piracy make international cooperation possible and necessary, on the other hand, the military build-up of these countries brings with it risks to peace. New arms races develop their own dynamics and increase the danger of, for instance, armed incidents. Crisis prevention, new arms control initiatives and disarmament must be connected with the goal of integrating the emerging powers into a common security architecture.

4.5. NATO and disarmament: How do they fit together? (Oliver Meier)

At the summit in Lisbon on 19/20 November 2010, NATO missed the opportunity to adapt its armaments policy to the new international reality. The nuclear weapons policy written into the new Strategic Concept remains unnecessarily conservative. The Alliance lacks the instruments and also the political unity to give new impulses to nuclear and conventional arms control or non-proliferation. NATO could make an effective contribution to the strengthening of disarmament by limiting its own military capabilities. The monitoring of the deterrence and defence measures of the Alliance set in motion in Lisbon, the new arms control committee as well as increased dialogue with Russia would offer the opportunity for NATO to create the conditions for further disarmament steps.

4.6. Missile defence in Europe: Territorial protection or an obstacle to nuclear disarmament? (Christian Alwardt, Hans Christian Gils and Götz Neuneck)

With the decision of NATO to recognize the territorial defence of Europe against ballistic missiles as a core task of the Alliance in the future, the possible concepts for a European missile defence moved increasingly into the focus of military and political debates. The agreement of the Alliance partners to this collective defence approach was very differently motivated. Technically, the ability of the available US defence systems to function remains controversial. The architecture of the NATO missile defence has, to date, been just as uncertain as the costs or its effect on nuclear disarmament. Of great importance will be in what way Russia can be included in these plans and how possible negative effects on other arms control efforts can be limited. The article identifies some possibilities for including Russia and for the prevention of undesirable effects on arms control.

4.7. *“Imagine that no one goes and there’s still war...” – The risks of robotizing of the armed forces (Niklas Schörnig)*

Unmanned “combat robots” still seem to be science fiction for many people. However, the first generation of such – to some extent armed – systems in the armies of the technologically more advanced Western states is, meanwhile, reality – a central military trend of recent years. Especially for the Western states, the advantages are obvious, for these machines replace soldiers and thus make possible missions that would otherwise not be feasible because of unacceptably high risks. The dangers of this robotization are overlooked or consciously ignored in the current armament decisions: In addition to a possible disinhibitory tendency, destabilizing developments or asymmetrical reactions are conceivable. It is worrying that this form of conventional armament evades practically every kind of arms control. Thus the article calls for Germany to practice restraint in the acquisition of these systems and take over a leadership role in the establishment of arms control regimes.