

Summaries

1.1. The Taliban: Reconciliation and Reintegration (Fotini Christia and Michael Semple)

Recently, the *Taliban* in Afghanistan have been wooed politically. The enthusiasm for reconciliation within the Karzai government has not yet been reflected in concessions by the *Taliban*. The most comprehensive form of reconciliation would be a “grand solution”, an internationally supported agreement between the Afghani government and the resistance leadership, which paved the way for the return of the insurgents into national life. Successful reintegration must include economic security and security guarantees for the insurgents. This presumes that the Taliban turn away from their narrative of leading a holy war and that the international actors as well as the government in Kabul move to cooperating with all Afghans who want to rebuild their country. Such an agreement would not be synonymous with a rapid withdrawal of the intervention troops, but would permit the ISAF deployment to be time- limited

1.2. The ISAF Deployment of the German Armed Forces. Comments on an Overdue Accounting (Winfried Nachtwei)

The ISAF deployment of the German armed forces is in a critical phase: In parts of its theatre of operations the German soldiers are confronted with guerilla and terror warfare. From time to time in 2009 they were involved in daily combat operations. For the NATO-led ISAF and, in particular, for the USA, 2010 is the year in which the deterioration in the security situation is to be turned around and the prerequisites for a gradual withdrawal of ISAF troops from 2011 are to be created. At the same time the deployment is in a deep crisis of acceptance: Among the German people, the rejection is broader than it has ever been. Among the soldiers, the political and military leadership have lost considerable trust. The Defense Committee of the Federal Parliament is investigating the air attack in Kunduz and the way it which it has been handled politically. An unvarnished review of the deployment has the highest priority.

1.3. The new Afghanistan Strategy of the Obama Administration (Jochen Hippler)

For several years the necessity of a “master plan” for Afghanistan has been discussed in Germany. However, the German debate suffers from a considerable lack of clarity since the strategic terms are arbitrarily used quite differently. Often behind the term “Afghanistan strategy” there is scarcely more than a grab bag of commendable but contradictory goals or wishes – gladly embellished with individual policy instruments, projects and programs. This linguistic confusion contributes to the inability of German and European policy to have any influence on the US Afghanistan debate. The result of the discussion there is an Afghanistan strategy presented by President Obama at the end of 2009 with clearly formulated political goals and their tactical consequences. The sending of 30,000 additional US soldiers is intended to create the preconditions for beginning to withdraw troops in 18 months.

1.4. Supremacy in the Pakistani Tribal Areas (Naveed Ahmad Shinwari)

The Pakistani tribal areas on the border to Afghanistan (FATA) are high up on the global security agenda because they are, in fact, a part of the Afghanistan war: They offer the *Taliban* there, other insurgents and *al-Qaeda* an area of retreat and possibilities for support. Furthermore, the FATA are more and more developing into hotbeds of religious extremism and terrorism within Pakistan which, all-in-all, threatens its stability. Up until now, no way has been found to establish good governance in the tribal areas and to ensure better living conditions. Without a deeper understanding of the region, approaches to solutions from international actors can hardly contribute to calming the

situation on both sides of the border. The internal power politics of the FATA, as well as their cultural and historical traditions must be taken seriously; otherwise they will not succeed in developing practical and effective solution strategies. Thereby the involvement of the local population is a key to success.

1.5. War power and the drug economy (Janet Kursawe)

For over 15 years Afghanistan's opium production has held the leading position globally. Among the chief beneficiaries of the Afghani drug trade are, above all, powerful wholesalers and smuggling syndicates. They form alliances with armed insurgent groups. These, however, profit far less from the drug economy than is generally assumed and have been able to diversify their sources of income. The security policy dimension of the opium problem is, thus, extreme. Classic, repressive, security policy instruments for combating drugs are not sufficient and are sometimes even counterproductive. The drug problem must, above all, be considered from a market economy perspective. Central for combating drug abuse is the price policy. The greatly declining price level has opened up policy alternatives such as comprehensive development projects and legalized cultivation of the opium poppy

1.6. Eight years after the invasion: an interim balance (Arvid Bell)

The original goal of the intervention, to expel *al-Qaeda*, has, indeed, been achieved but one cannot speak of peace in Afghanistan. In the last few years, the *International Security Assistance Force* has continually been expanded, but just as continually does the number of victims rise. The armed opposition controls broad swaths of the country; the weak state is powerless there. In the rural regions civilian development is making scarcely any headway; corruption, voter fraud and cooperation with unpopular *warlords* have seriously damaged the reputation of the government. Nevertheless, according to surveys, the majority of the population has not resigned itself to this; there are also individual achievements with respect to democratic and civil development. Needed now are peace talks, which certainly include all the parties to the conflict, but should not involve amnesty for war crimes.

2.1. There is no way to bypass Hamas (Claudia Baumgart-Ochse)

In January 2006 the Palestinian *Hamas* participated in a national election for the first time; one year later it agreed to a power sharing arrangement with its rival *Fatah* and expressed a certain readiness for compromise solutions in the conflict with Israel. However, the international community reacted with total isolation of the government in Gaza. The unity government fell apart; *Hamas* violently took over control of the Gaza Strip which has been cut off from the outside world for more than three years. Even Israel's military offensive in 2008/2009 could not topple *Hamas*. Instead of using the signs of a change in *Hamas* from a violent actor to a political party to include it politically, the policy of isolation only deepened the schism between the West Bank and Gaza and clouded the prospects for new peace negotiations.

2.2. Hezbollah in the political system of Lebanon (Jan Hanrath)

Since its founding in the early 1980s, Hezbollah has developed from a civil war militia into a recognized player in the political system of Lebanon. In the past few years, it has succeeded in expanding its power position in the Lebanese political system more and more. Thus, despite its election defeat in June 2009, it is represented in the government of national unity which came about in November 2009 after extremely difficult negotiations. Thereby, the danger of a persistent political blockade situation appears to have been averted for the time being and the uneasy balance

of power in the society to have been reestablished. However, whether this democratic orientation is a calculation of power politics or an actual transformation cannot be determined with any certainty. Even if Iran and Syria, as the current patrons of Hezbollah, could be integrated into an entire regional solution, a further transformation of the party can only be initiated from within its own ranks or by the Lebanese Shiites themselves.

2.3. Militias in Iraq: From factors of unrest to stability elements (Henner Fürtig)

Driven by the guidelines of the US civilian administration in Iraq both the opponents and the supporters of the new order after the toppling of Saddam Hussein congregated into ethnically or religiously oriented organizations. Their strength rested, above all, on the sovereignty of command over militias of their own which battled with increasing violence for power. After the restoration of Iraq's formal sovereignty, the aggressive militias received proto-state-like functions; thereby, however, the fragility of the new order became even greater. The cooperation of the US high command with the Sunni tribes and their militias from 2007 noticeably stabilized the situation; this pacification rests first and foremost on the diminished Sunni-Arab vacuum in the inner-Iraqi power relationship. The recourse to "archaic" patterns of order will, however, negatively affect the chances for the implementation of a modern Iraqi state.

2.4. The transformation of Jihadist groups in Egypt (Carolin Görzig und Khaled Al-Hashimi)

The current strategies on combating terror are confronted with a dilemma; if religiously motivated terrorists actually deal irrationally, as is mostly alleged, deterrence will help very little. Conversely, if selective concessions motivate members of *al-Qaeda* to this, then, in this case, true Muslims are being bribed and corrupted. Comprehensive collective concessions could, therefore, be called for. The success of material incentives to reintegration, as the German Foreign Minister suggests for the *Taliban*, is in no way assured. Strategies for disintegration bring about the opposite of what they intend, if ultimately the lack of *al-Qaeda*'s coherence explains their rejection of every restraint. The transformation of Jihadist groups in Egypt and its effect on *al-Qaeda* show the contradictions of current anti-terror strategies.

2.5. Can Yemen be stabilized? (Marie-Christine Heinze)

Yemen's President Salih has, up until now, ruled with a mixture of patronage, co-optation and *divide et impera* (divide and conquer) yet his power base is dwindling. The Yemeni government finds itself confronted with three conflicts; a secession movement in the south, the insurgency of the Houthis in the north and the local network of *al-Qaeda*. The authoritarian ruling structures have led to a system of corruption and abuse of authority which has enriched a small elite and let the majority of the population be politically marginalized and impoverished. In addition to the declining oil reserves it is, above all, the declining water level that is going to influence the future of the country. Yemen needs sustainable investment. The Gulf States in particular can, by supporting reconstruction, contribute to ending the conflict; however the Yemeni government must itself create the conditions for this.

2.6. The Kurdish conflict in Turkey: The end of violence? (Gülstan Gürbey)

In the Turkish conflict with the Kurds, there is no end of violence in sight. The state violence follows from the ideological basis of a national unity state. This ignores the Kurds' quest for autonomy. Nonetheless there is hope for an end to the violence. This is based on the change of course in the PKK which now aspires to an intrastate solution and is prepared to lay down its weapons, but also on the intersection between the demands of the Kurds and the Turkish forces for

reform. To use this chance now, violence must be renounced. The state should pick up on this intersection and with the help of a new non-ideological constitution guarantee the linguistic, cultural and political rights of the Kurds, strengthen local administrations, politically integrate the legitimate Kurdish parties and, with their help, seek ways to integrate the PKK.

2.7. Rebel groups and party competition in Liberia and the Ivory Coast (Christof Hartmann and Nora Schrader)

The establishment of transitional governments with *power-sharing* and subsequent democratic elections as a standard answer to violent conflicts has come under criticism. To end the violence, formerly violent actors are integrated into civilian transitional governments. This legitimates their grasp for political power and economic influence. To perform successfully in elections, the rebel groups thus face the challenge of transforming themselves into political parties. Despite all the differences in the dynamics of the violent conflicts and the form of the transition phase, both Liberia and the Ivory Coast have illustrated that the participation of violent actors in transitional governments can also directly contribute to their political marginalization. The article discusses basic institutional conditions which makes such a result likely.

2.8. South Africa's Way to Democracy (Judy Smith-Hoehn)

Twenty years ago many African countries managed the transition from authoritarian to formally democratic systems. The most notable transformation process was carried out in South Africa. The strategic decisions of the leadership of the then-liberation movement and the apartheid regime were central for this peaceful transformation. They show that both sides recognized the changed intrastate and international conditions and felt compelled by these changes to enter into negotiations. The successful and peaceful transformation is, however, also due to the coordinated and carefully thought-through reaction of the opposition; it could just as easily have decided on a "politics of revenge." Ultimately a range of "generalizable" understandings were formulated which could serve as signposts for other countries in their efforts to resolve their internal conflicts through negotiation.

2.9. Sudan at the crossroads (Michael Ashkenazi)

Sudan has been shaken by more than a half century of civil wars. The level of violence has declined but nevertheless, the situation has remained unstable. The likelihood that the non-state armed groups will lay down their weapons is slight. In 2005 a peace agreement was signed which guarantees South Sudan autonomy and foresees a referendum for its independence for 2011. This democratic decision must be respected even if it means the division of the country. The majority of the South Sudanese have, admittedly, no trust in the South Sudanese government. Their only possibility to put an end to the violent confrontations is good governance. Continued development aid requires noticeable results. It must, above all, concentrate on the rural areas. Many leaders of non-state armed groups see development aid as a personal source of income, thus the help that is not consistent with the fundamentals of accountability, transparency and effectiveness must be stopped

2.10. Difficult containment of violence in Nigeria (Etham B. Mijah)

Since the end of military rule, the security situation in Nigeria has deteriorated rapidly. The conflicts revolve around the oil resources and the revenues connected with them; in addition they are proceeding along ethnic and religious lines. The violence is an expression of perceived inequity, of neglect by the state and of poverty. It is thus a consequence of the inability of the state to provide basic services for its citizens. Since 2009 the central government has offered amnesty and a

program of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration for agitators. In order to transform the tendency of non-state actors to violence, strengthening democratic participation as well as transparency and responsibility of the government is needed. The majority of Nigerians need access to education and to health care. Ultimately international actors could make a contribution to the containment of weapons proliferation.

2.11. Peace agreement and system transformation in Tajikistan (Arne C. Seifert)

The five year Tajikistani civil war exhibits almost all of the characteristics of today's violent conflicts: regional power struggles, rivalries around political order and economic resources, problems with national minorities, Islamic "fundamentalism" and the meddling of regional powers. The parties to the civil war were not able, on their own, to end the conflict. Only when the UN together with Russia and Iran, which, as patronage powers, have their own interests in regional stability, brought the conflicting parties to the table, could the armed conflict be settled. The power-sharing arrangement suffered, however, from not going beyond the two quarreling elites and refusing other regional powers a coequal participation. For want of broad anchoring in the society, the peace agreement proved to be unsustainable. There is a risk that the structural causes of the conflict will be reproduced.

2.12. Is a conflagration threatening in the North Caucasus? (Regina Heller)

In the past two years, violence has gripped the North Caucasus anew, especially in the federal republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan and, since 2009, again in Chechnya. Militant Islamists increasingly admit to terror attacks. The causes of this violence are multifaceted: dissatisfaction with the brutal actions of the Russian and local security forces against the local population in the "war against terror", the grievances in the region that have been ignored for many years and the constantly smoldering Chechnya conflict. While Russia earlier tried to combat the violence with massive government counter-violence and to establish loyal, counter-regimes which were, to some extent, also violent, President Medvedev has now, for the first time, emphasized the structural causes of the problem. In light of such impulses from Moscow, the West should be prepared to support Russia's efforts at development and good governance in the North Caucasus. Thereby, the breeding group for radical Islamism in the region would be withdrawn.

2.13. Disarming and Reintegrating the Paramilitaries in Columbia (Ananda S. Millard)

Since 1964 at least 200,000 people have fallen victim to the civil war in Columbia. In 2002 the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the paramilitaries (AUC) began. They agreed to the dissolution; the security situation improved immeasurably. Yet, despite all the government efforts to integrate former fighters, success is not certain. The upper-level commanders who, through the government program were able to escape extradition to the USA for drug trafficking or received milder sentences, profited the most. Some of the lower ranks are turning more frequently to illegal businesses; this is not surprising when one examines the job market in Columbia and the discrimination against former fighters. What is needed is a reconciliation process between former paramilitaries and the civilian population.

2.14. Victorious peace in Sri Lanka: successful combating of terrorism? (Norbert Ropers)

With the victory of the government troops over the Tamil Tigers (*Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam - LTTE*) in May 2009, the Sri Lankan government succeeded in ending a civil war that had determined the fate of the island state for 25 years. The defeat of the guerilla organization sparked an international debate on the question of whether military "solutions" might not (after all) be a

suitable means to end protracted civil wars. While the government is seeking to build the post-war order on authoritarian principles similar to those they used in the war, the Tamil side and its diaspora are in upheaval after the defeat of the LTTE. The elimination of this organization is welcome. However, after nearly three decades of civil war and immense sacrifices, the Tamils again see themselves as second class citizens. Without a right to political participation for the Tamil-speaking minority, this will only lead to a prolongation of the conflict, not to its end.

3.1. Iran: domestic and foreign political challenges (Annette Schaper und Andrea Thimm)

For many years, Iran's nuclear program has caused extreme concern abroad. There is the well-founded suspicion that Iran is aspiring to the possession of atomic weapons; and it has been debated at an international level, how the development of an Iranian bomb could be prevented. At the same time, in the summer of 2009, Iran made headlines as a result of conflict-fraught domestic events, triggered by the suspicion of voter fraud in the presidential election. These two important areas of conflict have, until now, existed side by side quite disconnected, from both the perspective from inside as well as from outside of Iran. For the world community, the nuclear question in Iran continues to have the highest priority. The government, by contrast, presents the civilian side of the nuclear program as scientific and technological progress. It is attempting, thereby, to make its mark domestically. Thus two questions arise: Should foreign countries work harder towards a democratization of Iran? And, would this be conducive to preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon or more likely be counterproductive?

3.2. Germany's responsibility for a nuclear free world (Oliver Meier und Götz Neuneck)

In reaction to Barack Obama's initiative for an atomic weapon free world, the significance of nuclear weapons control in German foreign policy has increased. Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has rightly chosen disarmament as one of the key notes of his foreign policy. However, Germany still only insufficiently meets its own expectations for an active arms control policy. Berlin considers the interests of its allied nuclear weapons countries too much and the government trusts itself too little to be innovative – outside of the EU and NATO as well. However, in the question of the removal of the US atomic weapons that are still stationed in Germany, the Federal Republic has moved from being an admonisher to an actor. Now deeds must follow the proclamations in the Coalition contract. Germany should, however, not only advocate for the removal of US atomic weapons but also, to be consistent, for a change in the NATO atomic weapons policy overall.

3.3. A world without nuclear weapons – the false and the right questions (Giorgio Franceschini)

With his sensational speech in Prague on 5 April 2009, US President Barack Obama awakened new hope for global nuclear disarmament. His appeal to aim for peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons has also called forth critics of the plan who consider his vision of an atomic weapon-free world non-viable – and even denounce it as dangerous. Although the fundamental criticism of *Global Zero* frequently overshoots the goal, a range of difficult questions for its realization remain open. The greatest challenges to the *Road to Zero* lie in the areas of verification, rules implementation and weapons control. In the next few years, a new worldwide debate on nuclear disarmament must find persuasive answers to these questions which form a basis for international consensus.

4.1. World economic crisis: Armament motor or armament brake? (Michael Brzoska und Bernhard Moltmann)

The international finance and economic crisis has not fundamentally changed the trends in military expenditure and the arms business that have been noticeable for several years. With some exceptions, there has neither been a strong increase nor a strong decline in the financial volume during the course of the crisis. However, the “old” industrialized countries, in particular, will not be able to avoid reducing their military expenditures in the pursuit of debt reduction. By contrast, the “up-and-coming” countries such as China, India and Brazil will increase their military expenditures; thereby, they will act on their respective regional power aspirations. Currently, the world arms market exhibits opposing developments: in regions of conflict, weapons purchases are increasing, parallel to the modernization of armed forces in the “new” industrialized countries, while other countries go without new acquisitions. Accordingly the competitive pressure among the vendors is growing. These differentiations offer an innovative German arms control policy approaches for influencing regional armament dynamics, increasing transparency and controlling weapons dealing.

4.2. The effects of the economic and financial crisis on the Millennium Development Goals (Hans Diefenbacher und Volker Teichert)

The evaluation of the Millennium Development Goals has proven to be ambivalent. There has indeed definitely been progress in individual regions (Southeast Asia, East Asia) and countries (China and Indian), however the current tempo will in no way be sufficient to achieve all the goals by 2015. Above all, in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, poverty, hunger, child and maternal mortality as well as new infections of HIV/AIDS have not been able to be brought decisively under control. The ecological MDG are also a distant prospect. The global economic and financial crisis has further slowed down the already too slow process. Help should flow primarily into the least developed countries. Financial expenditures of more than 200 billion US dollars may be necessary in order to achieve the MDG. The new emphasis of the international agenda – the global economic and financial crisis – must not lead to having the poorest of the poor pushed further to the edge.

4.3. The world economic and nutrition crisis: old problems – new conflict potentials (Stephan Albrecht)

The economic crisis is actually a bundle of crises with multiple causes in different areas such as the finance, energy and automobile industries. There has been a nutrition crisis for many decades. The effects of the world economic crisis on the nutrition crisis are, however, region- and country-specific. The economic crisis negatively affects the nutritional situation in countless non-industrialized countries: through this the (return) remittances of migrants to their home countries, foreign direct investment, the budget for development help and for business are reduced. Various options to resolve the economic crisis have been discussed, among them, an authoritative, new governmental ordering of the financial system and a change-over from industrial production and consumption in the direction of sustainability. To cope with the nutrition crisis, increases in the productivity of family farm agriculture, compatible with nature, are the primary option for action.

4.4. The effects of the financial crisis on fragile states (Ulrich Volz und Sebastian Ziaja)

Reduced resource endowments of governments, a low per capita income, limited economic growth, reduced tax revenues, the loss of gold reserves, budget help that has ceased to exist and economic disparities increase the risk of conflict in the 28 countries considered to be particularly fragile. However a precise prediction for the outbreak of violent conflicts as a consequence of these different developments is not possible. To minimize the risk, there is no way out other than the establishment of robust governmental institutions. In this connection, technical cooperation has been demonstrated to be effective for strengthening statehood. Budget help enables anti-cyclical economic policy in crisis situations; social security systems for the poorest can cushion the

economic shocks. To reduce the violent conflicts in fragile states, it is advisable to make the purchase of small weapons more difficult through tightened restrictions and to raise the risk of criminal prosecution for insurgents.